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Introduction
On  April  26,  2004,  Senator  John 
Kerry  released  his  six-point  trade  pro-
gram, “Trade Enforcement: Asleep at the 
Wheel,” and conspicuously targeted China 
for violating worker rights, dumping, and 
supporting “illegal currency manipulation” 
(Kerry 2004). Five days earlier, senior Bush 
administration ofﬁcials met with Chinese 
Vice Premier Wu Yi to settle a few trade 
disputes (e.g., WiFi) but did not resolve the 
most  contentious  ones  (exchange  rates, 
semiconductors, and labor rights). 
US-China  relations  are  often  in  the 
spotlight  during  presidential  election 
years,  and  2004  is  no  exception.  Ever 
since President Richard Nixon’s celebrated 
trip  to  Beijing  in  1972,  the  party  out  of 
power has chastised the White House for 
being “soft on China”—in security terms, 
economic terms, or both. In turn, the ad-
ministration insists that it is both tough 
and diplomatic. During the 2004 political 
season, the growing bilateral trade deﬁcit 
(about $125 billion in 2003) and the loss 
of US manufacturing jobs (2.8 million be-
tween 2000Q2 and 2003Q3) provide topi-
cal themes for the familiar drama. 
Forces Larger Than China
The US bilateral deﬁcit with China is only 
part of the United States’ external imbal-
ance  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  US 
global  trade  deﬁcit  (goods  and  services) 
widened from $375 billion in 2000 to an 
estimated  $575  billion  in  2004  (season-
ally  adjusted  annual  rate,  data  from  US 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  2004).  In 
macroeconomic  terms,  when  a  country 
spends beyond its income—as the United 
States has done on a large scale for several 
years—imports  will  exceed  exports.  The 
gap between imports and exports is neces-
sary to absorb the difference between na-
tional spending and national income. The 
widening  US  trade  deﬁcit  between  2000 
and  2003  thus  reﬂects  lower  household 
savings and higher federal budget deﬁcits. 
The  rest  of  the  world  willingly  provides 
the dollars to ﬁnance US spending habits 
because the United States is an attractive 
place to invest (box 1). In fact, the United 
States is so attractive that the dollar ac-
tually  strengthened  in  foreign  exchange 
markets  during  2000  to  2001  when  the 
trade  deﬁcit  was  growing.  Under  these 
macroeconomic  conditions,  if  the  United Number PB04-5 September 2004 2
Box 1: US manufacturing and the US trade deﬁcit 
The  main  causes  of  the  US  trade  deﬁcit  (more  precisely,  the  US  current  account  deﬁcit,  $411  billion  in 
2000,  rising  to  $542  billion  in  2003)  are  low  national  savings  and  a  strong  dollar.  US  household  sav-
ings remain modest: 3 percent of household income in 2000 and 3.5 percent in 2003. Moreover, the fed-
eral budget surplus of $230 billion in 2000 turned into a deﬁcit of $401 billion in 2003.1 When the Unit-
ed  States  has  a  trade  deﬁcit,  it  is  concentrated  in  manufactured  goods,  mainly  because  manufactures 
are  the  most  readily  traded  sector  of  the  economy.  In  2003,  the  US  trade  deﬁcit  in  manufactures  was   
$483 billion. 
The trade deﬁcit is not the main reason for job losses in the manufacturing industries. The main reasons 
for manufacturing job losses between 2000 and 2003 were the recession (a drop in quarterly US purchases of 
manufactured goods from $479 billion to $462 billion between 2000Q4 and 2003Q2), and rising manufacturing 
productivity (accelerating from 3.4 percent annually in 1990–95, to 4.2 percent annually in 1995–2000, to 4.7 
percent annually since 2000). Net US manufactured imports increased from $396 billion in 2000 to $483 billion 
in 2003. Using a statistically estimated coefﬁcient of 8,178 jobs per billion dollars of manufactures output, the 
increase in the annual manufactures trade deﬁcit (between 2000 and 2003 of $87 billion) might be blamed for 
700,000 manufacturing job losses (see appendix table 8). Using a less mechanical methodology, Martin Baily 
and Robert Lawrence (2004) estimate that about 256,000 US manufacturing jobs (15 percent of the total) were 
lost due to rising net imports during 2000–03. 
Both estimates assume that a US manufactures trade deﬁcit causes a decline in US manufactures out-
put. However, on a quarterly basis, between 1990 and 2003, larger US manufacturing trade deﬁcits generally 
corresponded with higher, not lower, US manufacturing output. On average every $1 billion increase in US 
manufacturing output was accompanied by an increase of $240 million in the US manufacturing trade deﬁcit. 
To summarize, the political arithmetic that equates trade deﬁcits with job losses is either exaggerated or plain 
wrong (see appendix table 8).
Sources: Summers (2004), Baily and Lawrence (2004).
1 Lawrence H. Summers (2004) calculates that more than 100 percent of the deterioration of the US current account position 
over the past four years can be explained by the drop in the US net national saving rate. 
States did not have a growing bilateral trade deﬁcit 
with China, it would have experienced even faster 
growth in its trade deﬁcit with other countries.1
Manufacturing job loss is part of an even longer 
trend, as the United States increasingly becomes a 
service economy. Since 1950, the proportion of US 
jobs in the manufacturing sector has dropped from 
about 31 to 12 percent. But the absolute decline 
between  2000  (17.3  million  workers)  and  2003 
(14.5 million workers) was particularly brutal, and 
many ﬁrms and workers laid the blame squarely on 
China.2
China in Global Trade and Investment
Often  overlooked  is  China’s  role  in  global  trade. 
In  2003,  China  surpassed  Japan  as  the  world’s 
third largest importer.3 In 2003, China became the 
world’s fourth largest exporter, and two-way trade 
with China accounted for about 22 percent of the 
increase in world trade that year.4 The emergence 
of China as an economic power has been a boon for 
commodity producers in particular. China is cur-
rently  the  second  largest  consumer  and  importer 
of oil, and its demand for crude oil is projected to 
grow by 4 percent annually over the next decade.5 A 
decade ago, Chinese nickel consumption was one-
quarter of Japan’s. By the end of 2004, China will 
overtake Japan as the biggest consumer of nickel.6 
Natural  resource–producing  countries,  such  as 
Canada and Australia, clearly beneﬁt from China’s 
growing industrial output.7
Often  not  appreciated  is  the  openness  of  the 
Chinese  economy,  measured  by  the  trade-to-GDP 
ratio  (imports  plus  exports  divided  by  GDP).  The 
current  trade-to-GDP  ratio  for  China  is  about  56 
percent. By comparison, the Japanese and US trade 
openness  ratios  were  about  22  percent  in  2002.8 
Another indication of Chinese openness is the ratio 
between the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) Number PB04-5 September 2004 3
and GDP.9 The ﬁgure for China in 2002 was 35 per-
cent, for Japan 2 percent, and for the United States 
13 percent. 
US-China Bilateral Trade Friction
Since its accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), China has become the United States’ third 
largest trading partner and the sixth largest market 
for US exports. Between 2000 and 2003, US imports 
from China rose from $100 billion to $152 billion, 
while US exports to China climbed from $15 billion 
to  $27  billion.10  The  steady  reduction  of  Chinese 
trade barriers over the last two decades facilitated 
the growth of Chinese exports as well as imports.11 
The expansion of US-China commerce delivers lower 
prices to American consumers and producers and 
enables better use of resources in both countries. 
Despite beneﬁts on both sides of the trade equa-
tion, most US politicians view the bilateral deﬁcit in 
purely negative terms. 
When  evaluating  the  size  and  balance  of  US-
China  trade,  several  caveats  deserve  note.  Even 
though China runs a large bilateral trade surplus 
with the United States (about $125 billion in 2003, 
according to US statistics), it runs a trade deﬁcit with 
the rest of the world, most notably with its Asian 
partners (about $99 billion in 2003; see tables 1, 2a, 
and 2b).12 In 2003, China’s global trade surplus rep-
resented 2.5 percent of China’s GDP.13 However, the 
US-China bilateral trade deﬁcit may be overstated 
in ofﬁcial US ﬁgures because the US Department 
of  Commerce  (US  DOC)  includes  entrepot  trade 
through Hong Kong and is based on free-alongside-
ship (FAS) calculations. The US-China trade deﬁcit 
in  2003,  expressed  on  a  freight-on-board  (FOB) 
basis,14  adjusted  for  reexports,  totaled  about  $95 
billion, about 26 percent lower than ofﬁcial US esti-
mates (tables 3, 4a, and 4b) (Fung and Lau 2003). 
The  comparison  between  China  and  Japan  is 
instructive. Japan has run global current account 
surpluses since 1981, often very large. China has a 
shorter history of global current account surpluses, 
starting in 1993.15 Most of China’s accumulation of 
foreign  exchange  reserves  corresponds  to  inward 
ﬂows of FDI and speculative capital inﬂows in antic-
ipation of a revaluation, not trade surpluses. While 
Chinese exports accounted for nearly 6 percent of 
total world exports in 2003, they are still modest 
compared  with  Japan’s  record  of  10  percent  in 
1986 (see table 5 for a comparison of China’s export 
growth with other Asian economies).16
However, the US bilateral deﬁcit with China is 
now greater than it was at its peak (in 2000) with 
Japan. In 2000, the US bilateral trade deﬁcit with 
Japan was $85 billion, about 0.9 percent of US GDP. 
In 2003, the US bilateral trade deﬁcit with China 
was $125 billion, about 1.1 percent of US GDP. At 
the highest point (in 1986), the ratio between US 
imports from Japan and US exports to Japan was 
3.0. The comparable ratio for US trade with China 
in 2003 was 5.7. A ratio of 5.7 implies that US ex-
ports to China must grow nearly six times as fast as 
US imports from China to narrow the gap in dollar 
terms.  During  2000–03,  US  exports  to  China  in-
creased by 76 percent, while US imports from China 
grew by 52 percent.17 US exports grew a good deal 
faster than imports, but not fast enough to narrow 
the dollar gap.18
After China joined the WTO in December 2001, 
trade complaints were temporarily put on hold. The 
grace period is now over as US manufacturers, Con-
gress members, and labor unions scramble to ﬁle 
complaints.19 The US Congress has also joined the 
fray, tabling 12 bills against Chinese practices in the 
past year (appendix table 1). The complaints range 
from the undervalued renminbi (RMB), to China’s 
slow  progress  in  meeting  WTO  commitments,  to 
disputes over brassieres and furniture. This policy 
brief catalogues and evaluates the main complaints 
now on the table.
Table 1: China’s merchandise trade balance 
with selected partners, 2003 (Chinese 
statistics, unadjusted, billions of dollars)
Country/region
Merchandise
trade balance Exports Imports
Latin America 12 15 –3
European Union 72 53 19
East Asia  
(excluding Japan)
138 151 –13
ASEAN 31 47 –16
Middle East 16 15 1
Africa 10 8 2
Japan 59 74 –15
United States 92 34 59
Totala 438 413 26
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations
a. Refers to total merchandise trade with the world.
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (2003); China Ministry of 
Commerce data (2002).Number PB04-5 September 2004 4
Overview of the Disputes 
Table 6 summarizes, in a very rough way, the major 
trade  frictions  examined  in  this  policy  brief,  the 
ones now preoccupying authorities in Washington 
and Beijing. The ﬁrst two columns show the relevant 
trade  coverage,  expressed  as  a  share  of  bilateral 
trade (using US trade statistics). An asterisk indi-
cates whether the dispute is over US imports, US 
exports, or both. Figures in the last column of table 
6 roughly estimate the impact of a favorable resolu-
tion (from the US standpoint) on the US bilateral 
trade deﬁcit. However, for most of the disputes, the 
bilateral deﬁcit is a background factor, not the im-
mediate trigger.
The  biggest  dispute  is  over  the  renminbi  ex-
change rate. This affects all US imports from China 
and all US exports to China. It also has repercus-
sions throughout Asia. As a crude and probably high 
estimate, resolution of the dispute along the lines 
advocated by US ofﬁcials might reduce the bilateral 
trade deﬁcit by $20 billion. If other Asian countries 
follow China by revaluing their pegged or managed 
currencies, the United States’ trade balance could 
improve by $56 billion. Even if this estimate exag-
gerates the adjustment, the exchange rate clearly 
dominates other disputes in terms of trade impact. 
Textile and clothing disputes are so far limited 
to brassieres, but frictions over other items (starting 
with socks) could soon erupt. Assuming that cases 
brought in the next year restrain Chinese exports by 
ﬁve times the brassiere case, the total impact might 
be roughly $1.4 billion. If the Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment (MFA) expires as promised on January 1, 2005, 
and all quotas are lifted, Chinese exports might well 
face restraints of this magnitude or larger. 
Antidumping duties on wooden bedroom furni-
ture and color television sets may discourage up to 
$3 billion of US imports from China, although this 
is probably a high estimate. If China ends its tax 
discrimination against semiconductors, US exports 
might increase by $0.4 billion. 
All told, the dollar value of active trade disputes, 
in trade balance terms, may be in the range of $25 
billion—dominated ﬁrst and foremost by renminbi 
revaluation. We do not include the AFL-CIO labor 
rights petition in this count (or in table 6). How-
ever, the penalty tariffs sought by the AFL-CIO, if 
imposed, would raise the stakes by tens of billions 
of dollars. 
The Revaluation Debate
Since  1995,  China  has  ﬁxed  the  renminbi  at 
about 8.28 to the dollar.20 This is widely seen as 
an  undervalued  rate  because  China  has  sharply 
increased  the  size  of  its  current  account  surplus 
($45.9  billion  in  2003),  because  of  huge  foreign 
exchange reserves ($459 billion in May 2004), and 
because foreign investment ($53 billion in 2003) is 
pouring into China.21 Additionally, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the Chinese economy was 
“overheating” in 2003, with 9 percent growth and a 
boom in real estate prices. Revaluation could use-
fully complement China’s domestic policy measures 
designed to slow the economy to a sustainable pace. 
Table 2a: US-China trade, 1999–2003 (US statistics, unadjusted, billions of dollars)
Year
Merchandise trade Services trade Goods and 
services
trade balance US importsa US exportsb US imports US exports
1999 82 13 3 4 –68
2000 100 15 3 5 –82
2001 102 18 4 6 –82
2002 125 21 4 6 –102
2003c  152 27 5 7 –123
a. Imports for consumption.
b. Domestic exports.
c. Services trade estimated.
Sources: USITC Dataweb (2004); US Department of Commerce, BEA statistics (2004). Number PB04-5 September 2004 5
Table 2b: US trade with the world and current account balance, 1999–2003 (billions of dollars)





Year US importsa US exportsb US imports US exports
1999  1,017   642  181 265 –291 –291
2000  1,205   712  205 283 –414 –411
2001  1,133   666  202 275 –393 –394
2002  1,155   630  205 279 –451 –481
2003  1,250   651  246 305 –539 –542
a. US global trade deﬁcit is different from global trade deﬁcit calculated by BEA, cited on page one. BEA is based on total US 
imports and exports.
b. Domestic exports.
Sources: USITC Dataweb (2004); US Department of Commerce, BEA statistics (2004). 
Whether undervalued by 10 percent, 25 percent, or 
40 percent, the renminbi exchange rate has become 
the lightning rod for US-China trade relations.
Key Players 
In September 2003, Treasury Secretary John Snow 
openly criticized China for a pegged renminbi and 
advocated a ﬂoating exchange rate with some liber-
alization of capital controls. Arguing that “exchange 
rates should reﬂect economic fundamentals,” Snow 
urged China to stop its ofﬁcial intervention in the 
exchange market (Snow 2003).22 To underline the 
extent of his concern, Snow emphasized the case 
for ﬂoating exchange rates during his visit to Beijing 
in September 2003. In February 2004, at Snow’s 
urging, G7 Finance Ministers at Boca Raton under-
scored the importance of ﬂexible exchange rates. In 
April 2004, Snow appointed Ambassador Paul Speltz 
as his economic and ﬁnancial emissary to China to 
advocate a ﬂexible rate and liberalized capital ﬂows 
(Snow 2004). 
Subsequent to Snow’s initial statement, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan weighed in. By 
contrast  with  Snow,  Greenspan  (2004b)  advised 
against an immediate ﬂoating rate or ending capital 
controls.  Greenspan  emphasized  the  precarious 
nature of the Chinese banking system, which car-
ries a huge volume of nonperforming loans (NPLs).23 
Greenspan  argued  that  ending  capital  controls 
could trigger an outward ﬂood of capital (in search 
of more secure banks). This in turn might desta-
bilize the Chinese economy and drag down world 
growth.24  Greenspan  emphasized  that  continued 
large  purchases  of  dollars  was  inconsistent  with 
internal economic balance in China, implying that 
the renminbi should be revalued.
Capitol  Hill  has  added  to  executive  branch 
voices calling for Chinese currency revaluation. Ten 
out of 12 China bills introduced over the past year 
highlight the alleged unfair trade advantage of an 
undervalued renminbi (appendix table 1). In March 
2004, led by Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), sev-
eral senators from states hit by manufacturing job 
losses called for an “emergency” meeting with Presi-
dent Bush to discuss the impact of China’s foreign 
exchange rate policy on US factory workers. 
So  far,  nothing  has  come  of  administration 
or  congressional  initiatives.  However,  it  might  be 
worth  recalling  a  previous  intersection  between 
trade policy and currency values. In August 1971, 
President Nixon met with his top advisers at Camp 
David and agreed on a four-part plan to address the 
worsening US balance of payments (swinging from 
a surplus of 2.2 percent of GDP in 1970 to a deﬁcit 
of 1.2 percent in 1971): a 90-day freeze on wages 
and prices; an investment tax credit of 10 percent; 
an import surcharge of 10 percent; and closing the 
gold window. Moreover, at President Nixon’s urging, 
the Revenue Act of 1971 created the Domestic Inter-
national Sales Corporation (DISC), which provided a 
corporate tax break for US exporters. The aftermath 
of this package was the Smithsonian Agreement of 
December 1971, which initially realigned the ﬁxed 
exchange rates of Bretton Woods vintage, and ul-
timately led to a system of ﬂoating rates (Solomon 
1982). Circumstances in that era were vastly differ-
ent from those today, but history suggests that—by Number PB04-5 September 2004 6
breaking enough crockery in the trade arena—the 
United States can force other countries to alter their 
exchange rate systems.25 
Section 301 Petition 
The  National  Association  of  Manufacturers  (NAM) 
and other members of the Fair Currency Alliance 
(FCA) have mounted a business campaign to force 
revaluation of the renminbi. On January 21, 2004, 
President Bush reiterated that “countries like China 
have  got  to  deal  with  their  currency.”  Eight  days 
later,  FCA  hired  a  Washington  law  ﬁrm  (Collier 
Shannon Scott) to prepare a Section 301 petition to 
challenge the Chinese exchange rate.26 FCA aspires 
to persuade the US Trade Representative (USTR) to 
ﬁle a petition in the WTO. 
While privately pressuring China to ﬂoat its cur-
rency, the Bush administration dismissed the sub-
stance of the Section 301 petition in April 2004, even 
before it was ﬁled.27 For now, the FCA has retreated; 
after the US presidential election in November 2004, 
it could decide to formally submit its petition.28 
Undervalued Renminbi and GATT Provisions.  The 
FCA claims the renminbi is undervalued by 40 per-
cent, thereby allowing Chinese ﬁrms to export goods 
to the United States at artiﬁcially low prices, result-
ing in US job losses (Collier Shannon Scott 2004, 
FCA 2004). Speciﬁcally, the FCA contends that the 
undervalued Chinese renminbi violates the intent of 
GATT Article 15, which states, “Contracting parties 
shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent 
of the provisions of the Agreement” (Primosch 2004, 
GATT Article 15[4]). The FCA also contends that the 
undervalued exchange rate violates GATT Article 16 
and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing  Measures  Agreement,  which  prohibits 
export subsidies. What are the prospects for these 
complaints,  in the unlikely event that the next ad-
ministration decides to use the WTO as a forum for 
challenging China’s exchange rate policy? 
While no legal precedents are squarely on point, 
in our view this would be a losing case. According 
to its statistics, China is not running a signiﬁcant 
surplus in traded goods and business services—the 
subject matter of the WTO. China can claim that 
its large accumulation of  foreign exchange reserves 
($459 billion as of May 2004) reﬂects substantial 
inward ﬂows of FDI and some net intake of portfo-
lio capital (including “hot money”). Such ﬁnancial 
ﬂows are largely outside the purview of the WTO. 
Deferring to the realm of ﬁnance ministers and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WTO Appel-
late Body would be disinclined to read Article 15(4) 
so  broadly  as  to  condemn  China’s  exchange  rate 
policy. While partner-country trade statistics (box 
2) may show a persistent and large Chinese trade 
surplus, we think the WTO would give the beneﬁt of 
any statistical doubt to China. 
FCA  also  contends  that  the  undervalued  ren-
minbi  acts  as  a  “prohibited  export  subsidy”  that 
violates both Article 16 and Article 3 of the WTO 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
(SCM Agreement). WTO Article 3 prohibits “subsi-
dies contingent in law or in fact” on “export perfor-
mance.”29
Under the WTO, an “actionable” subsidy must 
satisfy three criteria: The subsidy must be “speciﬁc,” 
involve governmental “ﬁnancial contribution,” and 
must provide “beneﬁt” to the recipient. To be con-
sidered speciﬁc, the subsidy must be granted to a 
limited number of companies or be applied in a dis-
criminatory manner to select sectors. Government 
policies deemed to provide a “ﬁnancial contribution” 
include  giving  funds,  loans,  or  tax  concessions.30 
While “beneﬁt” is not precisely deﬁned, the context 
Table 3: Adjusted estimates of US-China 
merchandise trade, 1999–2003a (billions of 
dollars)




1999 65.1 17.7 –47.4
2000 80.3 21.4 –58.9
2001 83.5 24.7 –58.8
2002 104.0 27.4 –76.6
2003 129.3 33.9 –95.4
a. Estimates are adjusted for reexports through Hong Kong 
and markup margins.  
Source: Fung and Lau (2003). 
The dollar value of active trade disputes, in 
trade balance terms, may be in the range of  
$25 billion—dominated first and foremost 
by renminbi revaluation.Number PB04-5 September 2004 7
Table 4a: Major US merchandise exports  
(FAS value) to China, 2002 (unadjusted, 
millions of dollars) 
Product category Exports
Aircraft and Associated Equipment  3,428
Thermionic, Cold Cathode, and  
Photocathode Valves
 1,622
Telecommunications Equipment  1,026




Automatic Data Process (ADP) Machines  739
Fertilizers (Except Crude)  667
Machinery Specialized for Particular  
Industries
 620
Nonferrous Base Metal Waste and Scrap  459
Ferrous Waste and Scrap  455
Parts for Ofﬁce Machines and ADP  
Machines
 443
Pulp and Waste Paper  414
Heating and Cooling Equipment  414
Hides and Skins, Raw  390
Paper and Paperboard  326
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  322
Pumps, Air, or Other Gas Compressors  
and Fans
 313
Electrical Apparatus for Switching or  
Protecting
 307




All Other  7,933 
Total  22,053
FAS = free alongside ship
Source: US Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration data (2004).
Table 4b: Major US merchandise imports  
(CIF value) from China, 2002 (unadjusted, 
millions of dollars) 
Product category Imports
Toys and Sporting Goods  14,869
Footwear  10,227
Automatic Data Process (ADP) Machines  9,145
Furniture and Bedding Accessories  6,957
Telecommunications Equipment  6,401
Parts For Ofﬁce Machines and ADP  
Machines
 5,216
Sound Recorders and TV Recorders  4,488
Household Type Electric and  
Nonelectric Equipment
 3,232
Articles of Plastic  3,175
Lighting Fixtures and Fittings  2,887
Trunks, Suitcases, Vanity Cases,  
and Briefcases
 2,773
Articles of Apparel of Textile Fabrics  2,767
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  2,702
Radiobroadcast Receivers  2,525
Women/Girls Coats, Not Knit  2,469
Apparel and Accessories Except Textile;  
Headgear
 2,467
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles  2,377
Household Equipment of Base Metal  1,868
Manufactures of Base Metal  1,658
Made-Up Articles of Textile Materials  1,650
All Other  37,782 
Total  125,168
CIF = customs, insurance, freight
Source: US Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration data (2004).Number PB04-5 September 2004 8
of the WTO SCM Agreement implies that an action-
able subsidy must provide value to the recipient, 
whatever it may cost the government. 
Taking these three tests in reverse order, an un-
dervalued exchange rate, if it exists, surely beneﬁts 
exporting ﬁrms. Far less clear is whether an under-
valued exchange rate entails a “ﬁnancial contribu-
tion” by the Chinese government. The hypothetical 
petition  can  argue  that  importers  are  paying  too 
much renminbi for their purchases—in other words 
that  the  undervalued  rate  is  taking  money  from 
importers and giving it to exporters. This argument, 
in the WTO judicial context, is not far-fetched but 
would break new legal ground. We think it is un-
likely to prevail. 
Finally, and most difﬁcult for the hypothetical 
petition,  is  the  speciﬁcity  test.  An  undervalued 
exchange rate is probably the least speciﬁc of any 
beneﬁt that a government might confer. WTO case 
law in other subsidy disputes runs strongly against 
the proposition that an undervalued exchange rate 
qualiﬁes as a speciﬁc beneﬁt.31 Public policy mea-
sures that are generally applicable to broad swaths 
of the economy are not viewed by the WTO as action-
able subsidies; rather, for trade policy purposes, the 
focus is on sector-speciﬁc beneﬁts.
Undervalued Renminbi and IMF Article IV.  FCA 
alleges  that  China  violated  Article  IV  of  the  IMF. 
Article IV Section 1 (iii) states each Fund member 
should “avoid manipulating exchange rates or the 
international monetary system in order to prevent 
effective  balance  of  payments  adjustment  or  to 
gain  an  unfair  competitive  advantage  over  other   
members.” 
Morris  Goldstein  at  the  Institute  for  Interna-
tional Economics argues that the IMF is obliged to 
invoke Article IV to prevent currency manipulation. 
IMF Article IV Section 3 states that the Fund should 
“exercise ﬁrm surveillance over the exchange rate 
policies of members, and shall adopt speciﬁc prin-
ciples for the guidance of all members with respect 
to  those  policies.”  A  1977  Fund  Executive  Board 
paper lists indicators for questioning exchange rate 
policies,  including  “protracted,  large-scale  inter-
vention in one direction in the exchange market.” 
Under the principles of IMF Article IV and the 1977 
Fund Executive Board paper, it can be argued that 
China violated IMF conditions by maintaining ﬁxed 
exchange rates for a long period and by interven-
ing  on  a  large  scale  and  in  “one  direction  in  the 
exchange market.”32 In these circumstances, Gold-
stein contends that the IMF should initiate special 
consultations with China.33 
The likelihood that the Executive Board of the 
Fund will chastise China for breaching its IMF ob-
ligations is very small or nonexistent.34 If Managing 
Director Rodrigo Rato decides to address the Chinese 
currency issue, as we recommend, his deliberations 
will  very  likely  be  made  informally  behind  closed 
doors. Moreover, unlike WTO disputes, the currency 
issue will be debated on economic rather than legal 
criteria. Deliberations in the Fund’s boardroom will 
only be one part of larger negotiations over the ren-
minbi, involving bilateral talks between the United 
States, the European Union, China, and Japan, as 
well as G-8 ﬁnance minister meetings. 
How Much to Revalue? 
Most economists believe the renminbi is underval-
ued, although some do not. They differ widely on 
the extent of undervaluation. Appendix table 2 sum-
marizes several opinions. 
In the summer of 2003, Goldstein and Lardy at 
the Institute for International Economics advocated 
a revaluation of 15 to 25 percent, combined with 
a wider currency band and three-currency basket 
peg.35 According to Ernest H. Preeg (2003), senior 
fellow  at  the  Manufacturers  Alliance  (MAPI),  the 
renminbi is undervalued by 40 percent and recom-
mends a revaluation of at least 20 percent. Analysts 
at Goldman Sachs argue the renminbi is underval-
ued only between 10 and 15 percent.36
Manufacturing Jobs and Revaluation
The  charge  that  an  undervalued  Chinese  cur-
rency has caused US manufacturing job losses is 
Table 5: Comparison of China’s export growth 








Japan 1954–81 27 14.2
Korea 1960–95 35 21.5
Malaysia 1968–96 28 10.2
China 1978–02 24 11.9
NIEsb 1966–97 31 13.1
a. Periods of sustained export expansion, ending when the 
three-year moving average export rate declined below  
10 percent.
b. Newly industrialized economies: Hong Kong SAR, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan.
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 2004; Prasad and 
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substantially  exaggerated.  US  manufacturing  job 
losses over the past three years primarily reﬂect a 
weak economy (until August 2003),37 a strong dol-
lar against all currencies, and a US trade deﬁcit in 
manufactures with the world, not just China. More-
over, US manufacturing job losses are concentrated 
in sectors that are export-intensive for the United 
States but where China plays a small role (Mankiw 
2003). Finally, exchange rate relationships are not 
the key driver for sustained growth in Chinese ex-
ports.38 Chinese exports are growing rapidly on a 
sustained basis to all major destinations, not just to 
the dollar area (Ahearne et al. 2003). Between 1995 
and 2003, Chinese exports to the world increased 
from $149 billion to $438 billion, even though, dur-
ing this period, China’s peg to the dollar meant a 
nominal effective exchange rate appreciation of 21 
percent in the renminbi. 
While renminbi appreciation would not eliminate 
China’s  bilateral  export  surplus  with  the  United 
States, nor solve the multiple competitive problems 
facing the US manufacturing sector, it would make 
a difference. The size of the difference depends on 
how  many  dollar-oriented  Asian  countries  follow 
China in revaluing their currencies (see table 7).39 
Box 3 takes an optimistic look at the numbers and 
concludes  that  an  improvement  of  $56  billion  in 
the US manufacturing trade balance represents an 
outside limit. 
Evaluation 
By pegging the renminbi to the dollar and pursu-
ing export-led growth, China superﬁcially seems to 
be following the strategy pioneered by Japan and 
subsequently adopted by South Korea, Taiwan, and 
other Asian economies. There are, however, impor-
tant differences. Renminbi undervaluation is a fairly 
recent phenomenon,40 and unlike Japan and South 
Korea between the 1960s and 1980s, China has put 
out the welcome mat for foreign investment.
Unlike Japan, China does not have a long his-
tory of severe undervaluation and huge global trade 
surpluses. Nevertheless, over the past few years, the 
pegged renminbi has helped boost Chinese exports 
to the US market. While a renminbi appreciation 
will not reverse the fortunes of the US manufactur-
ing sector, a revalued renminbi (along with other 
Asian currencies) will help. An optimistic estimate 
of  Asian  currency  appreciation  (including  China) 
over the next two years is around 20 percent—about 
the same amount the euro, the yen, and a few other 
ﬂoating  currencies  have  already  appreciated.  An 
outside estimate of the induced improvement in the 
US  trade  balance—assuming  that  the  revaluation 
is accompanied by an improvement in the US sav-
ing/investment  balance41—is  around  $56  billion. 
Even the more realistic ﬁgure is a step in the right 
direction, but given the magnitude of US merchan-
dise trade deﬁcit (around $599 billion in 2003), the 
White House and Congress will need to take many 
other steps also. 
We conclude that the US Treasury should step 
up  pressure,  off-the-record,  for  China  to  revalue 
rather than ﬂoat. We see no merit in a high-proﬁle 
WTO  case  or  high-decibel  charges  in  the  Fund’s 
boardroom. We think a public battle would do more 
to  stir  a  backlash  within  China  than  promote  a 
reorientation  of  ofﬁcial  Chinese  policy  toward  the 
renminbi.
AFL-CIO Labor Rights Petition 
On March 16, 2004, the AFL-CIO ﬁled a lengthy 
petition  against  China  under  Sections  301  and 
302 of the Trade Act of 1974. The AFL-CIO petition 
Box 2: FCA petition and data manipulation 
The Fair Currency Alliance (FCA) claims that Chinese trade statistics deliberately minimize the degree of ren-
minbi undervaluation. The FCA claims that, during 1999–2002, the actual Chinese trade surplus (adjusted to 
account for Hong Kong reexports) was three to four times larger than China reported. For 1999–2002, FCA uses 
partner-country trade data for 43 countries to conclude that China underreported its exports by about $443 bil-
lion. Accepting partner-country import statistics as more authoritative than Chinese export statistics, it is still 
possible that China’s own trade balance ﬁgures are approximately correct. China’s imports may have exceeded 
ofﬁcial ﬁgures thanks to undervaluation (to avoid customs duties) and outright smuggling.  
A different possibility, suggested by the FCA, is that China has accumulated unreported foreign exchange 
reserves in the form of US currency. But do the numbers add up? Given that the amount of $100 bills in circula-
tion outside the United States in 2001 totaled about $280 billion, it seems unlikely that the Chinese populace 
is holding more than $50 billion of US currency. But the FCA numbers, at face value, suggest that China has 
unreported reserves upwards of $400 billion.  
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claims  that  Chinese  repression  of  workers  rights 
artiﬁcially depresses wages, giving a cost savings to 
manufacturing ﬁrms between 10 and 77 percent. In 
turn, the cost savings allegedly boosted Chinese ex-
ports of manufactured goods, leading to the loss of 
up to 727,000 US jobs.42 On April 26, 2004, Senator 
Kerry urged the Bush administration to accept the 
AFL-CIO Section 301 petition.
Labor Rights Denied 
The  AFL-CIO  petition  argues  that  the  absence  of 
freedom  of  association,  the  prevalence  of  forced 
labor, and the lax enforcement of national laws gov-
erning wage rates, hours, and occupational safety, 
all constitute a systemic violation of worker rights. 
Citing the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), the AFL-
CIO estimates that labor costs account for about 13 
percent of the total price for manufactured goods 
made in China and sold in the United States. The 
petition alleges that, if China ends its repression of 
workers rights, Chinese wages would increase be-
tween 90 and 595 percent, and the price of manu-
factured goods would thus increase between 12 and 
77 percent.43
Economic Arguments 
A  vast  number  of  Chinese  workers  will  enter  the 
manufacturing labor force over the next three de-
cades,  and  this  prospect  (with  India  added  on) 
sparks apprehension worldwide. Viewing the pros-
pect in another perspective, however, urbanization 
is a major source of Chinese economic growth (just 
as it was in Japan, Korea, and many other coun-
tries). The output of the average Chinese worker in 
industry and service activities is 4.6 times that of 
the average agriculture worker (Xie 2002). For now, 
the huge reservoir of rural labor (about 50 percent 
of the labor force, some 369 million persons)44 limits 
the rate of gain in urban wages generally and manu-
facturing wages particularly. Manufacturing wages 
in China currently average about 88 cents per hour 
(including fringe beneﬁts),45 about 6 percent of the 
US average.46 Because of fast productivity growth, 
Chinese unit labor costs have probably fallen in the 
past decade, even though nominal manufacturing 
wages have approximately doubled (table 8). While 
the petition claims real earnings of Chinese workers 
remained static or declined, real wages in China in-
creased by 45 to 65 percent since 1993.47 The AFL-

















bilateral trade deﬁcit 
(billions of dollars)
RMB revaluation (20 percent)a 100* 100* –124.0 20.2
Textile and clothingc 15.0* 1.4 –11.4 1.4
Furnitureb 39.8* 1.5 –11.7  2.8 
Semiconductorsd 3.2 5.4* 1.8 0.4
Color television setsb –0.8 0.2
Total imports  152.4 134.5
Total exports  28.4 35.6
Total trade balance  –124.0 –98.9
* = indicates whether the dispute is over US imports, US exports, or both
a. See text for explanation. This is a high-end estimate and assumes a $13.4 billion reduction in imports and a $6.8 billion 
increase in exports. Nicholas Lardy estimates a 15 to 25 percent revaluation of the renminbi would decrease the bilateral deﬁcit by 
about $15 billion.
b. Assuming the highest penalty duties (24 percent) apply to all imports and US demand elasticity equals –1.0.
c. Assuming WTO Paragraph 241 safeguards are applied to clothing imports with ﬁve times the potential effect of limits already 
imposed on brasseire imports. This may be a low estimate of future restraints, when the MFA quotas are lifted in January 2005.
d. Assuming the 13 percent VAT preference for domestic semiconductors is eliminated and the Chinese demand elasticity for US 
semiconductors is –1.0.
Source: OTEXA, USITC Dataweb (2004); Lardy (2004a).Number PB04-5 September 2004 11
CIO  petition  claims  that  Chinese  manufacturing 
wages stagnated as productivity increased, but the 
International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)  calculates 
that manufacturing wages in China (expressed in 
dollars) increased 179 percent from 1992 to 2002, 
or roughly 11 percent per year.48
The AFL-CIO petition asserts that wages will in-
crease once workers can form independent unions. 
However, average wages in China remain low (even 
though  they  are  rising  fast)  mainly  because  the 
average productivity of Chinese workers—including 
rural workers—is low, not principally because the 
Chinese government encourages low wages by pre-
venting workers from creating independent unions. 
Contrary to the petition’s claims, an OECD study 
(1996) concludes that the freedom to form indepen-
dent unions is not associated with real-wage growth 
and that the prices of US imports are not associated 
with enforcement of labor standards.49
The  petition  recommends  that  China  should 
raise average wages by 340 percent.50 According to 
the petition, this boost would increase the price of 
Chinese goods by an average 43 percent, thereby 
reducing US imports of Chinese goods and restoring 
US manufacturing jobs. However, few Chinese ﬁrms 
are proﬁtable enough to raise wages by 340 percent. 
Among modern economies, there is no precedent for 
an abrupt rise of this magnitude, without runaway 
inﬂation. 
The AFL-CIO petition relies on EPI calculations. 
The EPI claims that a higher bilateral trade deﬁcit 
correlates with lower manufactures output and lost 
US jobs. However, each $10 billion of bilateral trade 
deﬁcit with China substitutes for nearly $10 billion 
of collective trade deﬁcits with other countries. In 
fact, while US imports from China increased from 5 
percent of the total in 1992 to 12 percent in 2003, 
the  share  of  US  imports  from  other  East  Asian 
countries declined from 34 to 21 percent (Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce 2004b). Moreover, contrary to 
EPI  assertions,  a  US  manufacturing  trade  deﬁcit 
generally corresponds with high, not low, US manu-
facturing output (see box 1 and appendix table 8).51 
On average, US manufacturing output and the trade 
Box 3: Impact of renminbi revaluation on US merchandise trade 
Assuming that the Chinese renminbi appreciates by 20 percent and the price elasticities of US imports from 
and exports to China are both –1.2 (a coefﬁcient far above empirical estimates), the bilateral merchandise trade 
deﬁcit would decline by about $20 billion. This is an outside estimate, both of the size of renminbi appreciation 
in the next year and the trade impact.1 A renminbi appreciation of 20 percent, with an elasticity of –1.2, would 
cut the value of US imports from China by about $13 billion (versus the 2003 base level of $152 billion). With 
the same elasticity, an appreciation of 20 percent would increase the value of US exports to China by about $7 
billion (versus the 2003 base level of $28 billion). 
A more signiﬁcant effect than $20 billion would depend on all of Asia following the Chinese revaluation 
path (table 6). A 20 percent appreciation of neighboring Asian currencies combined would reduce the bilateral 
trade deﬁcit with all Asian partners (including China) by about $56 billion—again assuming optimistically high 
demand elasticities for US imports and exports of –1.2. US imports from Asian partners would decline by $26 
billion (versus the 2003 base level of $296 billion), while US exports to Asian countries would increase by $39 
billion (versus the 2003 base level of $116 billion).   
Using a different approach, Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy (2003) calculate that a 20 percent ren-
minbi appreciation, combined with a 10 percent appreciation by other East Asian economies and Japan, would 
reduce the trade-weighted index (TWI) value of the dollar by 5 percent. As a result, the US current account 
deﬁcit ($540 billion in 2003) would improve by about $50 billion. Given that the renminbi weight in the dollar 
index is less than 10 percent, a 20 percent renminbi appreciation by itself would reduce the TWI for the dollar 
by only 2 percent, improving the US current account deﬁcit by $20 billion.
Sources: Goldstein (2004); Goldstein and Lardy (2003).
1 With a US import price elasticity of –1.2, each 1 percent appreciation in the RMB would reduce the volume of US imports 
by 1.2 percent, while the unit price expressed in dollars would rise by 1 percent. With an export price elasticity of –1.2, the 
volume of US exports to China would increase by 1.2 percent for each 1 percent appreciation in the RMB, while the unit price 
expressed in dollars would remain constant. These calculations assume that Chinese FOB export prices remain unchanged 
in RMB terms, and US FOB export prices remain unchanged in dollar terms. Number PB04-5 September 2004 12




Change in trade balance 
after appreciation  US exports US imports  Trade balance
China 27 152 –125 20
Hong Kong 11 9 2 4
Korea 23 37 –14 9
Malaysia 10 25 –15 5
Philippines 8 10 –2 3
Singapore 17 15 1 5
Taiwan 16 31 –15 7
Thailand 5 15 –10 3
Total 116 296 –179 56
Note: Based on total US exports and imports. With a US import price elasticity of –1.2, each 1 percent appreciation in the renminbi 
would reduce the volume of US imports by 1.2 percent, while the unit price expressed in dollars would rise by 1 percent.
Source: USITC Dataweb (2004). 
deﬁcit both increase when the US economy is doing 
well, and both decline when the economy is doing 
poorly. 
Finally, the argument that violation of worker 
rights strengthens China’s advantage as a manu-
facturing hub ignores the importance of foreign af-
ﬁliates. Foreign afﬁliates generally pay higher wages 
and  adhere  to  better  occupational  safety,  health, 
and environmental standards (table 8).52 The aver-
age foreign afﬁliate in China pays wages that are 
30  percent  higher  than  the  average  state-owned 
enterprise and twice the average level of collective 
ﬁrms. Moreover, they account for a growing share of 
Chinese exports, increasing from 1 percent in 1985 
to 55 percent in 2003 (Lardy 2004b).
Legal Arguments
While the petition does not cite legal grounds for 
targeting China under GATT, there are two possible 
provisions for pursuing the petition under the GATT, 
Articles 20(b) and 20(e). Under GATT Article 20(b), 
WTO  members  can  enforce  “measures  necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” 
and under Article 20 (e), WTO members can prevent 
imports “related to the products of prison labor.”53 
Since the United States already bars imports made 
by prison labor, the real issue is Article 20(b).54 In 
the past, when Article 20(b) was invoked, as in EC 
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, the petitioner argued that hu-
man life or health in the importing country was at 
stake, and not human life or health in the exporting 
country.55
Contrary to precedent, the AFL-CIO petition es-
pouses the view that Article 20(b) can be used to bar 
imports on the grounds that they endanger human 
life or health in the exporting country (China). This 
is a far-reaching argument: The asserted interpreta-
tion would turn Article 20(b) into a hunting license 
against  imports  whenever  an  importing  country 
objected  to  workplace  or  health  standards  in  the 
exporting country. It seems unlikely that the WTO 
Appellate  Body  would  accept  this  interpretation, 
even if the USTR  espoused it. 
Evaluation 
On April 28, 2004, the Bush administration reject-
ed the AFL-CIO petition.56 USTR Robert B. Zoellick 
emphasized that the administration preferred to im-
prove Chinese labor standards through the ofﬁces 
of the ILO. In addition, Ambassador Zoellick argued 
that penalty tariffs on Chinese imports would “jeop-
ardize” growing US exports to China and preclude 
progress in opening Chinese markets to US goods 
and  services  through  WTO  negotiations.  Instead, 
the administration prefers bilateral engagement to 
broaden  cooperation  on  occupational  safety  and 
pension rights in China.57Number PB04-5 September 2004 13
We subscribe to the administration’s position. 
While current labor conditions in China are certain-
ly grim by US standards, they are vastly improved 
since  the  rule  of  Mao  Zedong.  Many  Americans 
espouse a humanitarian interest in raising Chinese 
labor standards, but this interest is distinct from 
immediate  trade  frictions  or  the  bilateral  trade 
deﬁcit.  Sweeping  penalty  duties,  as  advocated  in 
the  AFL-CIO  petition,  would  trigger  an  equally 
sweeping backlash in China. In the end, the trade 
battle would have less practical effect on lifting labor 
standards than other approaches—recourse to the 
ILO, self-administered standards by multinational 
corporations, targeted measures aimed at identiﬁed 
ﬁrms, and most importantly continued fast growth 
in China. 
Textiles and Clothing
Textile and clothing products are the most con-
tentious of all Chinese exports, both because China 
has  enormous  competitive  strength  in  this  sector 
and because the MFA, which severely restricts the 
natural  ﬂow  of  trade,  is  scheduled  to  expire  on 
January 1, 2005. This section ﬁrst summarizes the 
brassiere case and then turns to the wider implica-
tions of ending MFA. 
Brassiere Case
In  July  2003,  three  leading  US  textile  lobbying 
groups requested consultations with the US Com-
mittee for the Implementation of the Textile Agree-
ments (CITA), an interagency group chaired by the 
US DOC.58 As a result, the US DOC invoked special 
safeguard  provisions  to  limit  brassieres  and  kin-
dred imports from China. In November 2003, the 
US DOC imposed a 7.5 percent quota limit on the 
growth of Chinese bra, knit fabric, dressing gown, 
and robe imports above the levels reached between 
September 2002 and September 2003.59
CITA and the US DOC based their decision on 
rapidly rising imports of Chinese bras (from the sixth 
largest bra exporter in 2001 to the largest exporter 
in 2003) and declining US bra production. Chinese 
bra  imports  increased  by  249  percent  from  $120 
million in 2001 to $420 million in 2003, when they 
accounted for 27 percent of total US bra imports 
from the world (for further detail, see table 9, box 4, 
and appendix A).60
Bras are symbolic of many textile and clothing 
imports from China. The brassiere case in particular 
symbolizes an overriding fear of the potential ﬂood 
of Chinese textile and clothing exports once the MFA 
quotas expire in January 2005.61 During 2000–03, 
US imports of these products from China (mainly 
clothing) increased from about $8 billion to $12 bil-
lion (table 9).62 The Chinese share of US textile and 
clothing imports from the world grew steadily from 
11 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2003. 
While US exports have no legal bearing on a safe-
guards case, it deserves note that China imports US 
fabrics and raw cotton. US textile exports to China 
increased from $246 million in 2000 to $1.1 billion 
in 2003, rising from 1 to 6 percent of US exports to 
the world (tables 9 and 10). US cotton exports to 
China increased from $123 million in 1998 to $764 
million in 2003. 
Under  the  terms  of  China’s  accession  to  the 
WTO (Paragraph 241 of the Accession Agreement), 
safeguard tariffs and quotas can be applied solely 
against Chinese products. After an evidentiary hear-
ing and a ﬁnding of “material injury,” WTO members 
can impose product-speciﬁc safeguards against any 
Chinese export (including textile and clothing) until 
December 2013.63 In the special case of textiles and 
clothing (Paragraph 238), safeguards can be applied 
almost automatically until 2008 whenever imports 
create “market disruption” (a lower standard than 
“material injury”). Both provisions (Paragraphs 238 
and 241) are at variance with the WTO’s principle of 
nondiscrimination, which China agreed to waive as 
a condition of accession. 
Table 8: Annual average Chinese nominal 




Collective   
ﬁrms
Foreign-funded   
ﬁrms
1993 615  426  897 
1994 528  360  713 
1995 641  445  875 
1996 697  482  968 
1997 725  497  1,089 
1998 843  606  1,243 
1999 920 644  1,351 
2000 1,033  691  1,482 
2001 1,159  736  1,556 
2002 1,316  817  1,696 
Note: Wages do not include fringe beneﬁts and are based on 
annual averages (unknown hours worked).
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (2003); Lardy (2004).Number PB04-5 September 2004 14
ATMI Views
The American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI 
2003) is a leader among the lobbying groups that 
are seeking safeguard quotas. ATMI claims that the 
abundant supply of low-cost Chinese labor, the ma-
nipulated value of the renminbi, the poor enforce-
ment  of  textile  copyright  regulations,  and  export 
tax rebates all give China an unfair trade advan-
tage. ATMI recommends a new China-speciﬁc tex-
tile and clothing safeguard that would impose quota 
limits on virtually all imports when the MFA ends   
in 2005. 
Textile  and  Clothing  Job  Losses  and  Wage 
Levels.  Worldwide,  the  textile  and  clothing  in-
dustries are shedding workers. Between 1997 and 
2001, the US textile and clothing industry lost over 
180,000 jobs, more workers than the entire steel in-
dustry employs today.64 During the same period, the 
Chinese textile and clothing industry lost about 2.8 
million jobs.65 In the United States, two forces are at 
play: relatively slow demand growth and relatively 
rapid productivity growth.66 In China, while demand 
is still growing fast, productivity is growing much 
faster.
In most countries, textile and clothing workers 
rank near the bottom in terms of hourly wages. The 
abundance  of  migrant  workers  from  rural  China 
helps keep hourly wages for clothing workers lower 
(roughly  $0.88,  including  fringe  beneﬁts)  than  in 
other developing countries (e.g., $2.45 in Mexico).67 
By  comparison,  in  the  United  States  the  average 
hourly wage (including fringe beneﬁts) is $9.89.68
VAT  Practices  and  State-Owned  Enterprises.   
ATMI argues that the Chinese government subsi-
dizes its domestic textile and clothing industry both 
through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and an ex-
port tax rebate of 10 percent. According to ATMI, 
the  Chinese  government  owns  about  52  percent 
of the textile sector and 25 percent of the clothing 
manufacturing sector, and SOEs account for over 
a third of the industry’s production. The Chinese 
public sector subsidizes SOE output through direct-
ed bank loans and other means. 
Currency  Valuation.  Based  on  estimates  from 
the  Manufacturers  Alliance,  ATMI  alleges  that  an 
undervalued renminbi gives China a 30 to 40 per-
cent price advantage in the US market. ATMI al-
leges that China has violated Article IV of the IMF, 
the article that states each Fund member should 
“avoid manipulating exchange rates.” As mentioned 
in the earlier revaluation section, IMF Article IV has 
never  been  invoked  against  an  undervalued  cur-
rency,  and  formal  action  requires  an  85  percent   
supermajority. 
ATMI also claims that China has violated GATT 
Article 15, which states, “contracting parties shall 
not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the 
provisions of the Agreement” (see GATT Article 15 
[4]). Like IMF Article IV, GATT Article 15 has never 
been invoked against a country that undervalued 
its currency. Whatever the legal merits, the Bush 
administration has not been willing to pursue either 
an IMF Article IV or a GATT Article 15 case against 
China. 
End of MFA
Once the MFA comes to an end in 2005, the com-
mon perception is that China will dominate global 
textile  and  clothing  production,  displace  exports 
from other developing countries, and cause further 
job loss in industrialized countries.69 World Bank 
analysts estimate that roughly $200 billion in cloth-
ing production for export markets will shift to China 
over the next few years, the main losers being non-
Asian developing countries.70 For reasons detailed in 
a moment, we think that the wave of Chinese cloth-
ing exports will be smaller and slower. However, if 
the World Bank is right, additional Chinese exports 
on the scale of $100 billion or more could sharply 
enlarge China’s global trade surplus and consider-
ably augment pressures for renminbi revaluation.71 
With the end of the MFA in sight, European tex-
tile and clothing associations have joined ATMI and 
other textile lobbying groups to sign the Istanbul 
Declaration, which called for an emergency meeting 
by July 2004 to reassess the textile quota phaseout. 
The declaration proposes to extend the MFA deadline 
to December 31, 2007, at which date WTO members 
would determine whether to ﬁnalize the phaseout in 
2008 or develop an “alternative arrangement.”72
Sources of China’s Comparative Advantage 
The brassiere case is only the leading edge of US-
China  textile  and  clothing  disputes.  The  average 
The US Treasury should step up its pressure, 
off-the-record, for China to revalue. We see 
no merit in a high-profile WTO case or high-
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unit price of Chinese bra imports ($33.43 per dozen) 
is signiﬁcantly lower than imports from the rest of 
the world ($42.24 per dozen). Similar comparisons 
can be made for other clothing items. 
China’s  trade  advantage  in  clothing  goes  well 
beyond an undervalued exchange rate and public 
subsidies. China has a huge domestic market, which 
enables economies of scale and scope. In addition to 
abundant cheap labor (more on this later), China 
is well positioned for certain raw materials. Using 
advanced technology, China is now the world’s larg-
est producer of manmade ﬁbers.73 China has large 
domestic supplies of ramie, silk, and angora rab-
bit hair, though it imports large volumes of cotton   
and wool. 
Unlike other competitive textile and clothing ex-
porters, such as India, the Chinese government in-
vests heavily in infrastructure. Major highways link 
impoverished western provinces with industrialized 
coastal cities. With deep water ports, shipping times 
from  China  to  the  US  west  coast  are  faster  than 
neighboring southeast Asian countries and India.74 
The government encourages quality production of 
high-value fabrics by organizing the 600 best mills 
into 24 groups with its “Fabrics China” campaign 
If all other costs were equal, workers in 
the US clothing industry would need to be 
roughly 11 times more productive than 
China to offset the labor cost advantage.
Table 9: US-China brassiere and textile and clothing trade, 2000–03  
Commodity
US exports to China
(millions of dollars)
US imports from China
(millions of dollars)
US imports from China 
as percent of total US 
imports
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003
Brassieresa 1 0 0 0 134 120 290 420 9.6 8.6 18.1 27.4
Textiles and  
clothingb
246  287  461  1,122  8,006  8,250  9,551  11,992  10.7 11.2 12.7 14.9
a. Categories 349 and 649 as indicated in the CITA petition. 
b. Based on HTS Codes 50 to 63. In 2003, US textile exports to China accounted for 99 percent of total US textile and clothing 
exports; US clothing imports from China accounted for 72 percent of total US textile and clothing imports from China. 
Source: USITC Dataweb (2004). 
and has taken other steps to strengthen the Chinese 
textile and clothing industries.75
Above  all,  political  and  economic  attention 
focuses  on  labor  cost  differences  as  a  source  of 
Chinese comparative advantage. In the clothing in-
dustry, the US hourly wage averages $9.70 per hour 
(including fringe beneﬁts) while the Chinese hourly 
wage  averages  $0.88  per  hour  (including  fringe 
beneﬁts).76 If all other costs were equal, workers in 
the US clothing industry would need to be roughly 
11 times more productive than China to offset the 
labor cost advantage. While US clothing workers are 
substantially more productive than Chinese work-
ers—thanks to better capital equipment, technology, 
and training—they are not 11 times more produc-
tive.77 Other factors, such as proximity to markets 
(especially  for  “replenishment”  items)  and  access 
to raw materials favor US production. However, for 
decades to come the Chinese clothing industry will 
have a dramatic labor cost advantage over the US 
industry.78
Evaluation
The basic facts of comparative advantage pose the 
stark question: Will the US textile and clothing in-
dustry downsize to niches where it can compete with 
Chinese and other low-wage producers? Downsizing 
is a matter both of adjustment speed and ultimate 
industry size. The speed of the adjustment process is 
equally important as the ultimate extent. The Istan-
bul Declaration represents one effort to slow down 
the process.79 While the declaration has little chance 
of ripening into a WTO agreement, policy measures 
will almost certainly be taken to slow the feared Chi-
nese rush into world textile and clothing markets.80 
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will be moderated on an ad hoc basis, through the 
various safeguard and antidumping (AD) measures 
summarized in appendix A.81 “Moderated” does not 
mean “stopped.” Over the next decade, the textile 
and  clothing  industries  in  the  United  States,  the 
European Union, and other industrialized countries 
will need to shed a substantial part of its workforce 
as China, India, and other emerging countries en-
large their market share. 
In searching for niches where they can match 
Chinese competition, US clothing manufacturers will 
need to respond by emphasizing several factors: a) 
ultra-fast delivery of “replenishment” items; b) using 
high quality fabrics and the latest stitching meth-
ods; c) fashion items that are not price sensitive; d) 
higher value-added product markets that are less 
labor-intensive; and e) direct e-commerce sales to 
consumers, bypassing traditional retailers.82 Look-
ing at the entire chain of clothing production and 
distribution, the US industry will need to migrate to 
the distribution end of the spectrum. Indeed, well-
known  US  clothing  producers,  such  as  Sara  Lee 
Corporation, Nike, Levi Strauss, and Disney, have 
already deemphasized production activities in favor 
of better marketing of their brand names and retail 
outlets (Gerefﬁ 1999, US DOC 2004b). 
The  US  government  should  not  rely  solely  on 
safeguard measures and AD duties to protect US 
jobs. Instead it should assist the adjustment pro-
cess with an improved Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA)  program  that  makes  wage  insurance  and 
portable  health  insurance  its  centerpiece  (Kletzer 
and Litan 2001). Unlike traditional unemployment 
insurance and TAA programs, wage insurance ben-
eﬁts (including portable health insurance) take effect 
once a person ﬁnds a new job, thereby encouraging 
displaced workers to ﬁnd a new job as soon as pos-
sible.83 While the worker is unemployed the govern-
ment should provide minimal income support and 
basic health insurance. By ensuring a much better 
safety net, the US government can alleviate some 
of the embedded opposition to trade liberalization 
and encourage workers to seek on-the-job training 
in new jobs. 
Nonmarket Economy Status
Since 1995, China has become the primary AD 
target  worldwide.84  On  a  worldwide  basis,  during 
2003, Chinese exports were the subject of some 59 
AD cases, covering some $2.2 billion of trade (new 
AD cases initiated in 2003 covered $330 million of 
trade).85 The import coverage of US AD cases initi-
ated against China in 2003–04 exceeded $1 billion; 
since  2003,  about  half  of  all  US  AD  cases  have 
been targeted against China, about one new case a 
month. Meanwhile China is aggressively pursuing 
its own AD cases against foreign companies—some 
25 launched since 2001.86
China  is  designated  a  nonmarket  economy 
(NME)  in  US  AD  law,  and  this  designation  was 
carried into China’s accession agreement with the 
WTO. WTO members widely use the NME label to 
justify somewhat arbitrary calculations in AD cases 
against China. The NME designation implies that 
state  intervention  severely  distorts  Chinese  costs 
and  prices.  Consequently,  the  importing  country 
can use the costs and prices of “surrogate” coun-
tries to guesstimate the “true” costs and prices that 
would prevail if China had a market economy, and 
on that basis calculate AD margins. Under its WTO 
Accession  Agreement,  China  agreed  (at  US  insis-
tence) that WTO members could continue to apply 
the  NME  methodology  in  Chinese  AD  cases  until 
December 11, 2016.
China as NME Under US Trade Law
More than 60 countries now have AD laws. As Fin-
ger  (1993),  Messerlin  (1996),  and  other  trade  ex-
perts have long argued, the AD laws have become 
the easy road for imposing trade safeguards, with 
the further advantage (from the petitioner’s stand-
point) that the respondent bears the stigma of un-
fair trade practices. US AD law originated with the 
US Revenue Act of 1916 and was revised by the US 
Antidumping Act of 1921. The chances of winning 
an AD action were made substantially better for pe-
titioners in the 1979 legislation that implemented 
the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
(Finger 1993, Laroski Jr. 1999). In brief, under the 
NME methodology codiﬁed in the 1979 legislation, 
the US DOC estimates the costs of production in 
Table 10: China textile and apparel trade 





Textile and clothing 18.1 6.8
a. Exports of textiles and clothing as a share of  
total exports.
b. Imports of textile and clothing as a share of  
total imports.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2003).Number PB04-5 September 2004 17
any given NME country based on “surrogate coun-
try” prices.87 India and Singapore are examples of 
“surrogate countries” used to estimate production 
costs  in  China.88  The  only  favorable  aspect  of  an 
NME  designation,  from  the  respondent  country’s 
standpoint, is that NMEs are not currently subject 
to countervailing duties (CVD).89
Chapter  4  of  the  US  Tariff  Act  of  1930  (as 
amended in 1979) enumerates six criteria to deter-
mine whether a country merits NME status:90 cur-
rency convertibility, wage rates determined by free 
bargaining  between  labor  and  management,  joint 
ventures or foreign investments, government con-
trol over means of production, government control 
over allocation of resources and prices, and “such 
other factors as administering authority considers 
appropriate.”91
The alternative to NME status is market economy 
status (MES). Poland and Russia successfully made 
the transition from NME to MES in 1993 and 2000, 
respectively. The transition reﬂects a mix of political 
and economic criteria. In the case of China, gradu-
ation  from  NME  status  will  be  heavily  inﬂuenced 
both by the fears of AD petitioners and by China’s 
concessions on other trade issues. 
Issues Blocking MES for China 
Two days after Senator Kerry’s trade speech on April 
28, 2004, USTR Zoellick suggested the US govern-
ment would “leverage” China’s interest in MES with 
US interests on “labor, currency, subsidy, and oth-
er issues.” US Commerce Secretary Donald Evans 
opined that China will “fail to meet Market Economy 
status until market forces set labor and currency 
rates.”92  Both  the  Zoellick  and  Evans  statements 
were based on a mixture of politics and economics: 
the six criteria outlined in the statute plus senti-
ments in US Congress (expressed by the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission [USCC] 
and others). Out of this mix, the two primary hur-
dles are renminbi revaluation and labor standards. 
MES and Revaluation.  While the June 2004 US 
DOC  hearing  did  not  succeed  in  listing  concrete 
steps that China needs to take to reach MES, the 
hearing was useful in underlining US concerns. Be-
sides the sentiment that the renminbi is severely 
undervalued, speakers stressed restrictions on ob-
taining foreign currency from Chinese banks and the 
accumulation of ofﬁcial foreign exchange reserves. 
Box 4: Limits to global textile and clothing liberalization: The WTO MFA quota phaseout
US textile and clothing quotas are not a new phenomenon. Since the US Agricultural Act of 1956, the US 
government has used quotas to limit textile and clothing imports.  In the 1960s, industrialized countries, led 
by the United States and Europe, imposed short-term and long-term agreements to protect their own markets 
from cheaper foreign textile and clothing competitors. These were later consolidated, in 1974, under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), which in turn was revised 
and extended three times. As an outcome of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the WTO 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) established a staged and back-loaded liberalization of MFA textile 
and clothing quotas. In 2005, all quotas are supposed to be eliminated and the MFA abolished.  The stages are 
summarized below.
Year Quota relaxation
1994 WTO members required to permit quota-free volume of textile and clothing
imports to grow at 6 percent annually. 
1995–97 WTO members required to remove quotas on 16 percent of the total volume of each 
WTO member’s 1990 textile and clothing imports.
1998–2001 WTO members required to remove quotas on an additional 17 percent of the total 
volume of each WTO member’s 1990 textile and clothing imports.
2002–04 WTO members required to remove quotas on an additional 18 percent of the total 
volume of each WTO member’s 1990 textile and clothing imports. 
2005 WTO members required to remove all remaining quotas, usually the remaining 49 
percent of the total volume of each WTO member’s 1990 textile and clothing imports.
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The political question is not the extent of ren-
minbi convertibility, however, but the degree of re-
valuation. Since December 1996, China has met its 
IMF obligations for current account convertibility.93 
China is gradually moving toward capital account 
convertibility  by  allowing  foreign  banks  to  issue 
renminbi securities and allowing foreign investors 
to receive ﬁnancing from Chinese banks. While full 
convertibility may be a desirable goal, it is a goal 
that many developing countries have yet to meet.94   
In any event, US business and trade union leaders 
and congressmen and women, are more concerned 
about revaluing the renminbi than capital account 
convertibility. 
MES and Labor.  The USTR Foreign Trade Barrier 
Report (2004) contends that China violates core la-
bor standards, as deﬁned by the ILO. By contrast, 
according  to  China’s  Ministry  of  Commerce,  the 
Chinese government regulates minimum wages and 
social  security  requirements  but  otherwise  “pro-
motes  collective  bargaining  through  fair  negotia-
tion between labor and management.”95 Obviously 
a wide gap separates US and Chinese perceptions 
about labor practices and whether the government 
hand is heavy or light. 
Signiﬁcance of MES for China
To prevent future AD cases from following the ad 
hoc  and  often  discriminatory  NME  methodology, 
China is actively courting key trade partners to ob-
tain MES ahead of the 2016 WTO deadline. MES 
is obviously important when AD cases are litigat-
ed; it is also symbolic for China to be judged on an 
equal footing with Western industrialized countries. 
In April 2004, China made granting MES a precon-
dition for concluding a free trade agreement (FTA) 
with New Zealand. Since New Zealand granted MES, 
several other countries have followed suit.96 China 
is still working to get MES from Canada, the Euro-
pean Union, Japan, and the United States. 
China’s ability to receive MES from the European 
Union remains in doubt.97 A preliminary report is-
sued by the European Commission stated that the 
European Union “is committed to granting MES to 
China” but found that China has fulﬁlled only one 
of its ﬁve criteria—the criterion of “absence of barter 
trade” and “absence of State-induced distortions in 
the operations of enterprises linked to privatization.” 
China did not meet the European Union’s four other 
requirements: the degree of government inﬂuence, 
including  through  tax  discrimination;  adequate 
corporate  governance,  especially  with  accounting 
standards; transparent rule of law to ensure prop-
erty rights and operation of a bankruptcy regime; 
and a ﬁnancial sector that operates independently 
from the state.98
Evaluation
China’s  most  important  trading  partner,  for  pur-
poses of the MES designation, is clearly the United 
States. If achieving MES is important to China, the 
Chinese government will need to revalue the ren-
minbi. However, once China revalues, MES could 
still remain a bargaining chip for other trade con-
cessions sought by the United States. 
Even though give-and-take is the essence of trade 
negotiations, we think that the MES issue should 
not be determined solely by backroom bargaining. 
Instead, as a ﬁrst step, the US government should 
clarify measures required for meeting the “market 
economy” designation. If core labor standards are 
an essential criterion for granting MES, the same 
requirement should be applied equally to all coun-
tries. More broadly, all six statutory criteria should 
be evaluated, and a determination should be made 
through a public hearing process that enables a fair 
comparison between China and other countries that 
already  have  MES  status  (such  as  Russia,  India, 
and Pakistan). 
Furniture Case 
In October 2003, the American Furniture Manu-
facturers Committee for Legal Trade (hereafter the 
“Committee”) led 31 furniture makers and ﬁve unions 
to ﬁle a petition with the US DOC against Chinese 
furniture imports (US Federal Register 2003). The 
Committee  asks  for  AD  tariffs  ranging  from  150 
to 440 percent on over $1 billion worth of Chinese 
wooden bedroom furniture (WBF) imports sold by 
135 Chinese furniture companies. The Committee 
claims Chinese WBF exports were sold at “less than 
fair value” leading to “material injury” in the domes-
tic US furniture industry. According to the petition, 
Chinese  imports  accounted  for  23  percent  of  the 
value of domestic consumption in 2002, while sales 
from petitioner ﬁrms declined by 23 percent during 
2000–02. The Committee argues that lower Chinese 
prices and abundant labor are leading to job loss in 
the domestic furniture industry.99 Citing US Bureau 
of Labor statistics, the petition argues that 34,700 
jobs were lost since 2000, representing 28 percent 
of the furniture industry workforce. 
In  January  2004,  the  US  International  Trade 
Commission (USITC) determined the US domestic 
industry suffered material injury from Chinese WBF 
imports. In June 2004, the US DOC made a prelimi-
nary decision to impose relatively moderate duties, 
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account  for  the  majority  of  US  furniture  imports 
and 11 percent for all other Chinese ﬁrms. A ﬁnal 
determination is expected in December 2004. 
Unlike the bra case, in which the US govern-
ment  applied  WTO  safeguard  remedies  with  no 
prior hearing, the furniture dispute is a generic AD 
investigation. Since China is considered an NME, 
the US DOC uses prices and costs from supposedly 
comparable market economies (like India) to guess-
timate the cost of production in China.100
The trend in the US furniture industry is away 
from  manufacturing  and  toward  distribution  and 
marketing. In February 2004, one of the petitioners, 
Hooker Furniture, withdrew from the petition after 
calculating that the domestic US bedroom furniture 
market accounted for only 4 percent of its $309 mil-
lion sales in 2003. In fact, Hooker Furniture imports 
more than 40 percent of the furniture it sells, and 
Hooker is not alone. Several petitioners have nego-
tiated low prices from Chinese companies in order 
to resell the imported furniture in the US market. 
Among the 20 petitioners, imports from China ac-
counted for 35 percent of their total imports in 2002 
(USITC 2004b). 
Many furniture retailers, including the largest 
furniture store chains, such as Bombay Company 
and Crate and Barrel, also import from China. They 
retaliated against the petition by creating a lobbying 
group, the Furniture Retailers of America (FRA). The 
FRA objects that even a 20 percent US DOC dump-
ing margin would lead to average annual payouts, 
under the Byrd Amendment, to the domestic fur-
niture industry of $6.6 million per company.101 The 
prospect of banking this bounty could prolong the 
AD regime for years beyond its justiﬁed life. The FRA 
further argues that high AD tariffs would prompt 
furniture companies to source from countries such 
as Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam, 
rather than US manufacturers. 
In  response  to  the  US  DOC  determination 
against  Chinese  furniture  exports,  the  Chinese 
government initiated an investigation into imports 
of US hydrazine hydrate, a chemical used in water 
treatment.102  US  exports  of  hydrazine  hydrate  to 
China are far smaller than Chinese WBF exports to 
the United States ($1.7 million versus $1.4 billion in 
2003). How far this “retaliation” case will go remains 
to be seen.103
Background: Booming US and Chinese 
Housing Markets 
The booming US housing market is partly fuelling 
demand for Chinese furniture. Record low mortgage 
rates (declining from average 7.7 percent in Decem-
ber 2000 to 5.8 percent in December 2003) helped 
feed into demand for furniture. As a result, US pur-
chases of imported furniture nearly doubled from 
$2.3 billion in 2000 to $4.2 billion in 2003.104 Ris-
ing mortgage rates, beginning in the spring of 2004, 
could slow the furniture boom. 
Often overlooked is the growth in Chinese do-
mestic demand for furniture.105 While many Chinese 
furniture  producers  are  export  oriented,  foreign 
companies are gearing for the moment when China 
completely liberalizes its retail furniture market in 
January 2005.106 IKEA, one of the world’s leading 
furniture  brands,  will  expand  its  presence  to  10 
Chinese outlets by 2009.107 Ethan Allen Home In-
teriors, a leading high-end US furniture maker and 
retailer, recently opened its fourth store in China. 
Meanwhile, Chinese ﬁrms face increasing competi-
tion in the low-grade furniture market from neigh-
boring Southeast Asian countries and competition 
in high-grade furniture from US and EU exporters 
(USITC 2004b). 
China’s Role in World Furniture Trade 
The Chinese furniture industry relies both on 
economies  of  scale  and  cheap  labor  to  capture  a 
growing share of the world furniture market.108 Ac-
cording to the Chinese National Furniture Associa-
tion, Chinese furniture production grew from $13 
billion in 1999 to $20 billion in 2002, while Chinese 
furniture exports increased from about $2 billion in 
1999 to $5 billion in 2002.109
The Chinese furniture industry consists of about 
30,000 ﬁrms employing 5 million workers; 1,000 of 
these  ﬁrms  are  joint  ventures  with  foreign  inves-
tors.  Government  policies  that  encourage  foreign 
investment support the export-oriented success of 
Chinese  ﬁrms.  Furniture  production  for  export  is 
concentrated in special economic zones.110 Within 
these zones, China has developed specialized indus-
trial parks called “furniture towns,” which dominate 
furniture sales along the prosperous east coast. As a 
result, China is the world’s fourth largest furniture 
China should revalue the renminbi from 
time to time (and eventually adopt 
a floating rate) so that the Chinese 
“basic balance” (including inward direct 
investment) is approximately zero over the 
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exporter, and the United States is the top destina-
tion for Chinese furniture exports.111 Chinese fur-
niture exports to the United States increased from 
$359 million in 2000 to $1.2 billion in 2003. Often 
overlooked is that demand from US producers drives 
Chinese imports. From 2000 to the ﬁrst half of 2003, 
Chinese furniture imports as share of US domestic 
producer  shipments  increased  from  6  percent  to 
nearly 27 percent (Ikenson 2004). By 2003, nearly 
one-half of US furniture imports were from China, 
and Chinese furniture exports to the United States 
accounted for about half of total Chinese furniture 
exports (table 11).112
Another  side  to  the  furniture  story  is  China’s 
increasing demand for solid wood used to manu-
facture  furniture.113  In  fact,  China  is  the  world’s 
leading  importer  of  logs,  hardwood  lumber,  pulp, 
and paper. In the wake of the Yangtze River ﬂood of 
1998, the Chinese government emphasized forestry 
conservation and imposed a harvesting ban. Partly 
as a result, Chinese imports of solid wood soared 
from $5.3 billion in 2000 to $11.2 billion in 2002.114 
However, the United States supplies only a small 
fraction of China’s solid wood market. During 2000–
03, US wood exports to China more than doubled, 
to $253 million; at the same time, US wood exports 
to the rest of the world declined 22 percent but were 
still around $5 billion. Since US wood exports to 
China are only 5 percent of global exports, the main 
beneﬁt to US producers would appear to be higher 
prices, not larger volume. 
Evaluation 
Restricting imports of Chinese furniture, by AD du-
ties or other means, will not bring back US jobs. 
Instead, the main effect will be to curtail US house-
hold  purchases  of  furniture  and  to  shift  sources 
of supply to southeast Asia. The reality is that US 
furniture producers and retailers will source basic 
furniture either from China or other low-cost devel-
oping countries. In fact, the United States is a net 
importer in every furniture category, including ofﬁce 
furniture.115
To tackle job losses in the domestic furniture 
industry as in the clothing industry, the US gov-
ernment should improve the existing TAA program, 
emphasizing wage insurance and health beneﬁt pro-
visions (Kletzer and Litan 2001). Meanwhile, several 
US furniture makers will survive by distributing im-
ported furniture or by producing high-value crafted 
furniture. As a leading example, Ethan Allen has 
established a strong brand identiﬁed with elegance 
and high quality.116
Semiconductor Chips 
On  March  18,  2004,  the  Bush  administra-
tion ﬁled the ﬁrst US complaint against China in 
the  WTO.  The  US  government  alleges  that  China 
provides  preferential  tax  treatment  for  domestic 
semiconductor producers and that the preferences 
violate  China’s  national  treatment  obligations.117 
China imposes a 17 percent value added tax (VAT) 
on semiconductors, both imported and domestic.118 
Both foreign and domestic ﬁrms are eligible for vari-
ous export tax rebates (see appendix table 4), and 
these rebates do not appear to discriminate between 
locally owned and foreign-owned manufacturers. 
But China does appear to discriminate against 
imported  semiconductors  destined  for  use  in  the 
domestic market. If discrimination exists, it would 
violate the national treatment principle embodied in 
GATT Article 3.119 According to the USTR (2004b), 
domestic  producers  are  refunded  as  much  as  14 
percent of the 17 percent VAT. 
After the United States ﬁled its WTO case, both 
Japan  and  Taiwan  asked  to  join  the  WTO  con-
sultations (the ﬁrst stage under the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism).120 The dispute was resolved 
a few days before the United States was prepared 
to initiate a WTO panel. Through bilateral negotia-
tions, China agreed to eliminate VAT refunds for any 
new semiconductor products or manufacturers and 
will phase out semiconductor tax rebates by April 
2005.121 While the dispute is resolved, similar dis-
putes could well arise in the future as China seeks 
to strengthen its role as an information technology 
leader.  An understanding of key issues in the semi-
conductor case is therefore still relevant.  
SIA Role
The US Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), 
representing about 85 percent of the US semicon-
ductor industry, was the driving force behind the 
WTO case (Howell et al. 2003). The SIA attributes a 
substantial part of total investment in the Chinese 
China’s semiconductor policy is only one 
aspect of a broad drive to become a world 
leader in information technology industries. 
Another aspect, equally worrisome to 
foreign suppliers, is China’s drive to develop 
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domestic  integrated  circuit  (IC)  industry,  totaling 
$3.6 billion during 2000–02, to the discriminatory 
VAT policy.122 In addition to its objections to the VAT 
rebate, the SIA claims that the Chinese government 
offers low-interest loans and cheap land to nurture 
its domestic semiconductor industry. The SIA fears 
that excessive investment will not only make China 
a serious rival in high-technology circuits but also 
create overcapacity and depress world semiconduc-
tor prices (Craib 2004). The SIA argued that China 
should  either  reduce  its  VAT  to  3  percent  for  all 
semiconductors,  regardless  of  origin,  or  eliminate 
them altogether.123
China’s Role in World Semiconductor Trade 
Electronics and information industry products play 
a huge role in China’s external trade, both as im-
ports and exports (table 12). In 2003, these goods 
accounted for nearly half of China’s merchandise 
exports. Semiconductors are an important part of 
the larger picture. 
China already has the world’s third largest do-
mestic semiconductor market, closely following the 
United States and Japan (see tables 13a and 13b for 
a comparison of US semiconductor and electronics 
and information industry trade with China versus 
Japan).  Within  China,  domestic  semiconductor 
purchases are expected to rise by 16 percent per 
year and exceed Japan by 2010. Taken as a region, 
the western Asia-Paciﬁc region has already become 
the largest semiconductor market in the world, sur-
passing the United States in 2001.124
Underpinning the Chinese semiconductor mar-
ket are booming domestic computer and telecom-
munications  sectors.125  The  Chinese  share  of  the 
world IC sales market jumped from under 3 percent 
in 1997 to 15 percent in 2002 (table 14).126
To  satisfy  domestic  demand,  China  currently 
imports at least 80 percent of the semiconductors 
used in electronics production (table 12). Domestic 
Chinese production is still concentrated on low-end 
technology.  The  Chinese  government  is  trying  to 
reduce its net import position and upgrade its do-
mestic mix toward more sophisticated IC products 
between 2005 and 2010.127 As part of its plan, the 
Chinese  government  offers  incentives  to  domestic 
and foreign companies through about 500 special-
ized investment zones.128 The results are noteworthy. 
Motorola,  for  example,  established  a  $1.9  billion 
fabrication facility in Tianjin.129 
Chinese Tax Incentives 
Among the many tax and trade incentives the Chi-
nese government offers, some are particularly ben-
eﬁcial for foreign ﬁrms (see appendix table 4). Most 
foreign  ﬁrms  are  exempt  from  import  quotas.  A 
foreign-owned ﬁrm with advanced technology pro-
duction techniques and equipment may qualify for 
technologically advanced enterprise status (TAES). 
Beneﬁts  of  TAES  include  an  initial  ﬁve-year  ex-
emption  from  taxes,  then  a  further  ﬁve-year  50 
percent reduction in corporate income taxes (to a 
minimum 7.5 percent rate), and then an additional 
three-year 50 percent reduction (to a minimum 10   
percent rate).
Another incentive is the research and develop-
ment  (R&D)  tax  deduction.  If  a  foreign  company 
establishes an R&D center and increases its R&D 
outlays by 10 percent or more in two consecutive 
years,  it  may  deduct  150  percent  of  its  R&D  ex-
penses for corporate tax purposes. 
Local incentives are also available.130 As an ex-
ample, the Pudong New Area in Shanghai refunds 
land use fees and land grant fees for preapproved 
R&D centers and subsidizes property taxes under 
the Pudong Technology Development Fund up to a 
maximum $145,000. 
China’s Legal Defenses 
On its face, China’s VAT policy violated the nondis-
crimination principle embodied in GATT Article 3. 
Discrimination, if established, is a per se WTO vio-
lation; the petitioner does not need to demonstrate 
trade injury. The WTO precedent in Japan Alcoholic 
Beverages II appears to squarely confront China.131 
If  it  defended  the  case  in  the  WTO,  China  might 
have advanced three arguments: ﬁrst, that domestic 
manufacturers are subject to requirements that do 
not apply to importers; second, that domestic and 
imported semiconductors are not like products; and 
third, that the Chinese system is merely a subsidy 
paid to domestic producers, not a means of tax dis-
crimination.132  Neither  of  the  ﬁrst  two  arguments 
seems  compelling:  The  requirements  imposed  on 
domestic ﬁrms are normal business practices (fund-
ing R&D, expanding plant capacity), and the legal 
decrees that establish the rebate do not differentiate 
between types of semiconductors.133
The third argument is the strongest. Article 3 
does not prevent payments to domestic producers 
from the proceeds of internal taxes, as long as tax 
discrimination is not used to protect domestic pro-
duction (GATT Article 3 [8b]). In a future IT subsidy 
case,  China  might  boost  local  capabilities  with  a 
nondiscriminatory R&D subsidy or an investment 
tax credit, exclusively paid to domestic producers.   
Foreign producers would face an uphill battle chal-
lenging these subsidies.134Number PB04-5 September 2004 22
Evaluation 
The United States won the battle but could still lose 
the war.  China could shift to other forms of pub-
lic support, particularly for high-end IC production.   
Since the domestic Chinese semiconductor market 
is booming, and since many foreign ﬁrms are partic-
ipating in the boom, the SIA might have a hard time 
both in marshalling its members to oppose second-
generation  subsidies  and  in  demonstrating  trade 
injury. However, if the time comes (say ﬁve years 
hence), when Chinese semiconductor and other in-
formation technology (IT) ﬁrms sell large quantities 
on world markets and depress prices, it seems likely 
that safeguard and AD remedies will be invoked to 
slow the Chinese export push. 
Other Pending Cases 
WiFi Standard 
China’s semiconductor policy is only one aspect of a 
broad drive to become a world leader in IT industries. 
Another aspect, equally worrisome to foreign suppli-
ers, is China’s drive to develop a domestic wireless 
industry. In December 2003, invoking national se-
curity and the need for uniquely Chinese encryption 
methods,  the  Chinese  government  insisted  on  its 
own national wireless standards, to be launched in 
June 2004. The national standards are an alterna-
tive to existing WiFi (Wireless Fidelity) international 
standards.135 In response, Intel, the world’s largest 
chipmaker, announced it would not sell its high-end 
Centrino chip in the Chinese market. Nokia stated 
it would stop shipping wireless products to China if 
the new national standard took effect. 
In March 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Pow-
ell, Commerce Secretary Evans, and USTR Zoellick 
sent a joint letter urging China to withdraw plans 
for developing a domestic wireless local area net-
works, or WiFi, standard. In the wake of bilateral 
trade talks in April 2004, China agreed to delay in-
deﬁnitely plans to launch its own WiFi standard.136 
This agreement does not, however, preclude China 
from  resurrecting  unique  WiFi  standards  at  a   
later date. 
Television Case
In May 2003, one US ﬁrm and two labor unions ﬁled 
an AD petition with the US DOC and USITC against 
imports of Chinese color televisions (CTVs). After de-
termining that China is an NME, the US DOC used 
India as a surrogate country to impose preliminary 
AD duties ranging from 4.3 to 24.5 percent on 13 
Chinese CTV companies.137
After  its  hearing,  the  USITC  found  “material 
injury,” based on the adverse impact that the rising 
volume of Chinese CTV imports exerts on US prices 
and  producers  (USITC  2003).  The  USITC  claims 
that Chinese CTVs sold at prices between 10 and 30 
percent lower than average US prices contributed to 
the decline in US production of CTVs from 5.6 mil-
Table 11: US furniture trade with China and major partners, 2000–03 (millions of dollars)
US exportsa US importsb
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003
Canada  42   35   34   35   407   407   394   386 
Indonesia  0   0   0   0   109   108   129   125 
Italy  0   0   1   3   168   166   180   169 
Mexico  6   7   5   5   166   143   125   96 
China  0   0   0   1   359   477   817   1,163 
World  105   104   89   78   1,508   1,640   2,058   2,413 
US-China furniture trade as share of 
total furniture trade (percent)
 0.2   0.3   0.2   1.2   23.8   29.1   39.7   48.2 
a. Domestic exports.
b. Imports for consumption.
Source: USITC Dataweb (2004).Number PB04-5 September 2004 23
lion units in 2000 to 1.1 million units in 2002, and 
industry job losses totaling 7,068 during the same 
period. However, US imports from China are only 9 
percent of US imports of CTVs from all countries. 
(USITC Dataweb 2004). 
On  May  14,  2004,  the  USITC  commissioners 
voted unanimously in favor of AD duties on US im-
ports of Chinese CTVs. AD duties against the “big 
four” Chinese CTV makers, which account for 90 
percent of all Chinese CTV exports to the United 
States, range from 4 to 26 percent.138 All other Chi-
nese CTV makers face duties of 78 percent.139 The 
US  DOC  and  USITC  rulings  will  effectively  block 
some  Chinese  CTVs  from  the  US  market,  but  it 
seems likely that CTV imports from Chinese ﬁrms 
facing lower AD duties will ﬂourish. Moreover, CTV 
imports from alternative suppliers, such as Mexico 
and Korea, may quickly replace Chinese CTVs on 
the shelves of Wal-Mart and Best Buy. As in the 
clothing and furniture cases, the main result will 
not be to revive manufacturing activity in the United 
States but to shufﬂe the mix of foreign suppliers. 
Intellectual Property Rights
Better  Chinese  enforcement  of  intellectual 
property rights (IPR) is listed in ofﬁcial US docu-
ments among the Bush administration’s priorities 
(USTR 2004b). Indeed, since 1991, China has been 
consistently blacklisted for IPR infringements (see 
appendix  tables  5,  6,  and  7).  IPR  was  front  and 
center in China’s WTO accession talks, conducted 
by USTR Charlene Barshefsky during the Clinton 
administration. 
In  response  to  IPR  complaints,  the  Chinese 
government  has  signiﬁcantly  strengthened  the 
rules governing protection and enforcement. China 
acceded to the Measures on Implementation of the 
Madrid Agreement on Trademark International Reg-
istration and Regulations on Customs Protection of 
IPR in October 1989, the Rules on Determination 
and Protection of Well-Known Trademarks in Au-
gust 1996, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
in October 2001.140 To facilitate coordination among 
36 Chinese government departments with responsi-
bilities for enforcing IPR protection, China created, 
in fall 2003, the “Leading Group” led by Vice Premier 
Wu Yi. 
Despite  considerable  progress,  China  remains 
the  principal  exporter  of  counterfeit  and  pirated 
goods, both to the United States and the world.141 
Counterfeiting and piracy pay, and some Chinese 
ﬁrms take advantage of their technical skills and 
marketing  opportunities  to  pursue  these  activi-
ties.142 The International Intellectual Property Alli-
ance (IIPA), an inﬂuential lobbying group represent-
ing 1,300 US-based copyright companies, estimates 
Chinese  piracy  cost  US  ﬁrms  $2.6  billion  in  lost 
sales in 2003.143 Poor enforcement of IPR is partly 
rooted in a weak legal system, coupled with pro-
vincial corruption and favoritism for Chinese ﬁrms. 
This  section  summarizes  the  signiﬁcance  of  IPR 
protection for the US and Chinese economies, the 
scope of inadequate IPR enforcement, and bilateral 
efforts to bolster the IPR agenda. 
Since  Chinese  IPR  ﬁnes  are  based  on  prices 
charged  for  pirated  goods,  rather  than  the  value 
of  legitimate  goods,  and  since  punitive  damages 
do not exist, the penalties for infringement can be 
light. Fines for retail piracy are reportedly as low as 
between $6 and $25. Another problem is the high 
monetary threshold (about $6,000 in the Supreme 
People’s Court) before a criminal investigation for 
IPR  theft  can  be  initiated.  Finally,  opaque  proce-
dures hamper criminal enforcement. Time limits for 
criminal  investigations  are  undeﬁned,  delays  are 
commonplace, and local favoritism and corruption 
are routine. 
Importance of Chinese IPR Enforcement 
Signiﬁcance  for  the  US  Economy.  IPR  issues 
of greatest concern to the United States are in the 
copyright area. US copyright industries contributed 
about $535 billion to GDP in 2001. Between 1977 
and  2001,  US  copyright  industries  grew  twice  as 
fast (7 percent annually) as the rest of the economy 
(3 percent annually). In the same period, US em-
Table 12: Chinese trade of electronics and 





exports as share 
of total Chinese 
exports 
(percent)
1999 51 39 33
2000 54 55 37
2001 59 65 37
2002 85 93 43
2003 128 142 49
Note: Semiconductors account for a signiﬁcant share of 
electronics and information industry trade. 
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1997 3.4 137.2 2.5
1998 4.3 125.6 3.4
1999 6.6 149.4 4.4
2000 11.7 204.4 5.7
2001 15.2 139.0 10.9
2002 17.8 119.0 15.0
Sources: Semiconductor Industry Association, World Market 
Sales & Shares (2003); Hatano (2003).
ployment in core copyright industries grew by 5 per-
cent annually while economywide employment grew 
by only 1.5 percent annually. US copyright industry 
exports plus foreign sales, on a global basis, totaled 
$89 billion in 2001, more than industries such as 
automobiles, aircraft, or agriculture (IIPA 2002). For 
the United States, copyright protection in China is 
important both as a bread-and-butter issue and as 
a precedent for other developing countries. 
Signiﬁcance for the Chinese Economy.  Among 
scholars, there is a lively debate whether IPR pro-
tection helps or hinders growth in developing coun-
tries.144 China, however, is rapidly graduating toward 
developed-country status, especially in its leading 
industries. As China climbs the economic ladder, 
the arguments for IPR protection become more per-
suasive.145  To  take  the  most  immediate  case,  IPR 
protection is integral to the development of IT in-
dustries. Economywide, in 2001, China spent $72 
billion (measured in PPP terms) on R&D, positioned 
behind the United States (about $280 billion), Ja-
pan ($104 billion), and the European Union ($187 
billion) but ahead of individual EU member coun-
tries.146 Despite a high level of R&D expenditure and 
numerous skilled researchers, China generates few 
innovations.147 The negligible number of innovations 
has many causes, but one of them is the high inci-
dence of piracy and counterfeit trade in China.148  
Key Piracy Concerns
IPR  enforcement  is  still  relatively  new  for  China. 
China has, however, established a system for civil 
damages. As an example, the US recording industry 
obtained 26 judgments (out of over 40 cases) against 
copyright infringers through Chinese civil litigation 
in 2001 (IIPA 2003). Nevertheless, according to IIPA, 
China still accounted for $2.6 billion or about 26 
percent of worldwide US copyright sales losses in 
2003. In 2003, China also accounted for 66 percent 
of all US Customs and Border Protection seizures of 
IPR-infringing goods (USTR 2004b). In ﬁve key copy-
right sectors—motion pictures, records and music, 
business software applications, entertainment soft-
ware, and books—the piracy rate in China is said to 
exceed 90 percent.149
Optical  Disc  Piracy.  While  the  Chinese  govern-
ment seized over 75 million VCDs, CDs, CD-ROMs, 
and DVDs in 2002, an estimated 690 million unli-
censed CDs, DVDs, and VCDs are created each year 
in China.150 In 2002, music piracy in China was said 
to cost the US music industry nearly $600 million 
in lost sales. Pirate DVDs in China sell for between 
$0.76 and $2.50 per disc, a fraction of DVD retail 
prices in the United States. VCDs, a video CD for-
mat invented by pirates in China, are sold at pric-
es ranging from $0.76 to $1.92 per disc, and VCD 
players are sold for as low as $43. 
Internet Piracy.  Internet piracy is a growing phe-
nomenon.  With  over  58  million  internet  users  in 
2003, China has the second or third highest inter-
net usage rates in the world. Currently over 7 million 
music ﬁles have been downloaded from over 1,000 
active pirate music web sites. Piracy of videogames 
and business software are also persistent problems. 
To establish higher standards, the US government 
has urged China to sign two 1996 copyright treaties, 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), together known as 
the WIPO Internet Treaties. 
Evaluation 
Whether the US-China Joint Commission on Com-
merce and Trade (JCCT) meeting between Vice Pre-
mier Wu Yi and USTR Zoellick, held on April 21, 
2004, achieved more than lip service to IPR enforce-
ment remains to be seen. Some agreed measures 
have a déjà vu ﬂavor (e.g., IPR working groups to 
strengthen bilateral cooperation, consultations be-
tween trade, and judicial and law enforcement de-
partments), but others are new and may be more 
effective.  Following  the  April  2004  meeting,  the 
US government promised to expand its program of 
technical training to include Chinese judges, pros-
ecutors,  and  customs  ofﬁcials.  The  Chinese  gov-
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criminal investigations against IPR violators. Other 
steps pledged by the Chinese government include 
expanding market access for imported audio-video 
products and a public education campaign to raise 
awareness of IPR protection. 
Despite high piracy rates and repetitive bilateral 
talks  over  IPR  issues,  the  United  States  has  not 
brought WTO trade cases against China for IPR in-
fringement. The absence of barking WTO cases does 
not ensure that the dog will stay sleeping.151 Trade 
history in the pre-WTO era is instructive. In Novem-
ber 1991, the USTR threatened to impose $1.5 bil-
lion in trade sanctions if China did not reach an IPR 
agreement. By January 1992, China and the United 
States established a memorandum of understand-
ing (MOU) on IPR. Similarly, in February 1995, the 
USTR  announced  100  percent  import  tariffs  un-
less China enforced its IPR obligations. By March 
1995, another US-China MOU on IPR was signed. 
US patience over weak IPR protection could again 
wear thin. Recently, the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission Report (USCC 2004) 
strongly recommended to the US Congress that the 
USTR should pursue WTO disputes over “China’s 
failure to protect intellectual property rights.” 
An assessment of Chinese IPR efforts will be the 
focus of US attention in mid- to late 2005, when 
the US government completes its out-of-cycle review 
of China’s “Special 301” investigation. Whether or 
not the United States initiates a WTO case, if China 
wishes to gain cooperation from the US government 
in other areas such as MES, China will need to dem-
onstrate its IPR resolve through stronger enforce-
ment actions. 
Conclusion
The  cases  and  complaints  against  China  in 
2003 and 2004 partly reﬂect election-year forces. 
If and when China revalues, pressures may tempo-
rarily ebb. However, the individual industry cases 
now in dispute are harbingers of additional cases as 
Chinese ﬁrms begin to compete in new industries 
and expand their world market share in established 
lines. Disputes cannot be avoided, but they can be 
managed. 
From the US perspective, these complaints add 
up to widespread concern about the loss of manufac-
turing jobs and the pace of adjustment. But China 
has more than an export stake in settling disputes. 
More  than  a  decade  ago,  under  Chairman  Deng 
Xiaoping, China decided to use WTO membership 
and globalization more broadly, as a lever to trans-
form the economy from state-run to market-driven. 
Enormous progress has been made, but the task 
is far from complete. The Chinese leadership has a 
major political investment in avoiding trade clashes 
with the United States, since acrimonious disputes 
could call into question China’s larger commitment 
to domestic reform. 
Comparison with Japan
The history of US trade frictions with Japan (sum-
marized in appendix B) may foreshadow the rocky 
path ahead with China. Postwar restraints on textile 
and clothing imports started in 1957 when Presi-
dent  Dwight  Eisenhower  negotiated  a  “voluntary” 
restraint  agreement  (VRA)  with  Japan.  The  next 
big Japanese trade dispute was over steel: In 1968, 
President Lyndon Johnson negotiated a VRA. Dur-
ing the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions (1974–79), Ambassador Robert Strauss held 
heated talks with his Japanese counterparts over 
access to beef and other agriculture markets. Dur-
ing the 1980s, under President Ronald Reagan, the 
United  States  imposed  VRAs  on  semiconductors, 
steel, and autos and also initiated a round of mar-
ket access negotiations. The intensity of US trade 
disputes with Japan only abated in the mid-1990s, 
as the US economy boomed and the Japanese econ-
omy slumped.152
When  comparing  US-China  frictions  with  the 
history  of  US-Japan  trade,  four  key  political  and 
economic factors should be considered. One factor 
that does not augur well for managing future friction 
is the absence of a security alliance. The US-Japan 
postwar security alliance, cemented in the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security (1960), dampened 
the decibel level of US trade complaints. Obviously 
no such alliance exists with China. In fact, future 
security  tensions  could  serve  to  inﬂame  trade   
disputes. 
Another factor not in China’s favor is the import-
to-export ratio. As table 15 shows, the bilateral ratio 
between US imports and US exports is signiﬁcantly 
higher for China today than for Japan in 1986—a 
China should announce the progressive 
phaseout of domestic subsidies and 
incentives for infant industries (such 
as semiconductors) and eliminate 
them altogether in industries that have 
demonstrated their prowess in export 
markets (textiles and clothing). Number PB04-5 September 2004 27
ratio  of  5.7  versus  3.0,  respectively.  To  close  the 
absolute dollar size of the bilateral trade gap, this 
means that US exports to China should grow more 
than six times as fast as imports, whereas the com-
parable benchmark for Japan was more than three 
times as fast. By implication, the absolute size of 
the US-China bilateral trade deﬁcit will very likely 
expand for a considerable period.153
The openness of the Chinese economy compared 
with Japan, however, is a key plus. A broad measure 
of openness is the ratio of external trade (imports 
plus exports) to GDP. As shown in table 15, China’s 
trade ratio increased from 25 percent in 1986 to 56 
percent in 2003. By comparison, Japan’s trade ratio 
declined from 17 to 11 percent.154 Another measure 
of China’s openness is the ratio between the FDI 
stock and GDP.155 The ﬁgure for China increased 
from less than 1 percent in 1986 to 35 percent in 
2003. By comparison, the Japanese ﬁgure declined 
from a meager 3 percent in 1986 to only 2 percent 
in 2003. A third measure is the size and persistence 
of  global  trade  surpluses.  Japan  has  run  large 
surpluses for more than 30 years; China has run 
smaller surpluses for less than 10 years. 
A ﬁnal factor is the size of Japan and China as 
players in global trade. Chinese exports still account 
for a relatively modest share of world exports. In 
2003, the Chinese share was 6 percent; at the height 
of export-led growth, Japan reached 10 percent in 
1986. In future years, China may surpass Japan’s 
erstwhile share of world exports, but for now China 
is not shaking world markets to the same degree 
Japan did in the mid- and late 1980s. 
Lessons from History 
Based  on  the  history  of  US-Japan  trade  friction, 
modulated  by  the  four  factors  just  discussed,  we 
foresee decades of US-China trade friction but—if 
China revalues—at a lower intensity than US-Japan 
friction at its peak in the 1980s. China will continue 
its export push into foreign markets, adding higher-
technology products to the familiar mix of textiles, 
clothing,  toys,  and  furniture.  At  the  same  time, 
China’s openness and rapid growth will ensure that 
China remains an exceedingly attractive market for 
FDI, commodity exports, and a wide range of man-
ufactured and service exports. Taken together, we 
think these forces ensure a long drum roll of trade 
cases. Security alliances will not shelter Chinese ex-
porters,  but  commercial  considerations  (foremost, 
the large stock of FDI in China) will dampen the ex-
cesses of trade protection. Against that background, 
we offer a few recommendations for managing dis-
putes over the next few years. 
Chinese Policies
Based on its huge domestic market, its high sav-
ing rate, its entrepreneurial skills, and its pool of 
cheap and often skilled labor, China has enormous 
competitive advantages. To realize the value of its 
competitive strengths, China needs an open world 
trading system that can not only absorb a growing 
volume of Chinese exports but also supply imports 
of  raw  materials  (oil,  copper,  and  soybeans)  and 
manufactured goods (electrical equipment, aircraft 




























1986 4 4 1.0 0.25 0.1 0.00 1.4
2003 152 27 5.7 0.56 447.9 0.35 5.9
Japan 
1986 82 27 3.0 0.17 44.0 0.03 9.9
2003 118 49 2.4 0.11 59.6 0.02 6.4
a. Based on US imports from consumption. 
b. Based on US domestic exports.
Sources: USITC Dataweb (2003) for US imports and exports; UNCTAD World Investment Report (2003) for inward stock of FDI; 
IMF World Economic Outlook (2004) for GDP in current prices; WTO Statistics Database (2004) for Japanese, Chinese, and world 
exports; and IMF Balance of Payments (2004) for trade to GDP ratio.Number PB04-5 September 2004 28
parts, and medical instruments) that China cannot 
produce at competitive costs. 
In  its  best  long-term  interests,  China  should 
take several measures to foster an open world trad-
ing system in the years ahead: 
•  China should revalue the renminbi from time 
to time (and eventually adopt a ﬂoating rate) so 
that the Chinese “basic balance” (including in-
ward  direct  investment)  is  approximately  zero 
over the business cycle.156
•  China should not wait for lengthy WTO nego-
tiations to liberalize access to its own markets. 
Instead, China should take the lead and launch 
its own program of unilateral liberalization and 
challenge other WTO members to invigorate the 
Doha Development Round. 
•  China  should  announce  the  progressive 
phaseout of domestic subsidies and incentives 
for infant industries (such as semiconductors) 
and eliminate them altogether in industries that 
have demonstrated their prowess in export mar-
kets (textiles and clothing). 
•  China should impose much higher civil dam-
ages for pirated and counterfeit goods. It should 
also use public criminal proceedings to discour-
age the worst instances of IPR theft. 
US Policies
For their part, US leaders should publicly declare 
that expanding trade relations between the United 
States and China serve US economic interests, even 
when China has a bilateral trade surplus. Economic 
criticism leveled at Chinese policies should focus on 
China’s trade balance with the world, exchange rate 
equilibrium, market access barriers, unwarranted 
subsidies,  and  IPR  issues—not  China’s  bilateral 
surplus with the United States. 
In industries where Chinese imports are rising 
rapidly and genuinely injure domestic US ﬁrms, the 
United States should apply time-limited safeguards. 
WTO  Paragraph  241  safeguards  are  preferable  to 
Paragraph 238 safeguards. Both safeguards violate 
the WTO nondiscrimination principle in that they 
can  be  imposed  solely  against  Chinese  exports. 
However, unlike the automatic process of Paragraph 
238,  Paragraph  241  safeguards  require  an  initial 
investigation to determine whether Chinese exports 
inﬂict some degree of injury on domestic ﬁrms. 
Ahead of the 2013 date for the expiration of WTO 
Paragraph 241 safeguard actions, the United States 
should shift to normal safeguards when domestic 
industries  face  trade  injury.  Normal  safeguards, 
unlike Paragraph 241 safeguards, apply against all 
imports (except FTA partners): They cannot single 
out China for discriminatory trade restrictions. 
Likewise, well ahead of the 2016 expiration of 
the NME designation, the United States (and other 
WTO members) should phase out the application of 
this discriminatory status against Chinese exports. 
To effectively address the impact of imports on 
US manufacturing job losses, the US government 
should improve the TAA program, focusing on wage 
insurance and health beneﬁt initiatives. 
Joint China-US Policies
To manage trade frictions, and keep political tem-
peratures within bounds, the US and Chinese gov-
ernments should formalize senior-level semiannual 
meetings to complement subcabinet dialogue. The 
recent April 21, 2004, meeting between USTR Zoel-
lick and Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi was a construc-
tive example. After the April 21, 2004, JCCT meet-
ing, China agreed to “suspend indeﬁnitely” its plans 
to develop a unique WiFi standard, accelerate the 
opening of its services sector, and more strictly en-
force IPR.157 For its part, the United States agreed to 
renew exports of certain high-technology items that 
have a national security dimension (e.g., machine 
tools).  The  meeting  also  created  working  groups 
aimed at trade remedies and China’s NME status. 
Such semiannual meetings between the United 
States  and  China  will  be  useful  for  addressing  a 
rolling  agenda  of  key  issues.  The  next  meeting 
should be scheduled to take place soon after the 
US  presidential  election.  It  should  focus  on  the 
semiconductor dispute, pending termination of the 
WTO MFA, and constructive measures to improve 
Chinese labor standards.Number PB04-5 September 2004 29
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5 In 2003, China accounted for half of global consumption of ce-
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(2004).
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averaged 2.8 percent. As a comparison, during the period 1994 
to 2003, when the Chinese economy grew strongly, China’s 
global current account surplus averaged 2.0 percent of GDP.  
In 2003, China’s current account surplus reached 3.3 percent 
of GDP. Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy argue that the 
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(2004) and Lardy (2004a).
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With existing underemployment in China estimated at 200 
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1960s to 2003 did not reduce the Japanese trade surplus with 
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beneﬁts) was 30 cents an hour. Based on 2002 ﬁgures, from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) LABORSTA database. 
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56 See USTR (2004a). In rejecting the petitions, Ambassador 
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See CITA (2003).
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61 The fear was a central issue in the 2004 South Carolina 
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18, 2004, A1.
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ary 28, 2004. Also see Knappe (2003).
64 See “Textile In The News,” ATMI press release, March 6, 2002; 
“Tangled Up In Textiles,” The Economist, March 28, 2002; and 
Kristi Ellis, “US Reviews China Economy,” Women’s Wear Daily, 
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on Osakwe’s speech at the Washington International Trade As-
sociation (WITA) sponsored event, “Textile and Clothing Quotas: 
The End Is Near or Is It?” April 28, 2004. See “Major European 
Textile and clothing Associations Agree to the Istanbul Declara-
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74 Shipping times from China to the US west coast average 12 to 
18 days, while shipping times from Southeast Asian countries 
to the United States average about 45 days. See USITC (2004a).
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Imports,” The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2004, B7. 
81 In anticipation of these safeguards, some leading US clothing 
retailers have suggested China might adopt an internal quota 
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85 Based on data from China Ministry of Commerce, Bureau of 
Fair Trade for Import and Export (2004). Since 2002, the United 
States and the European Union ﬁled 96 AD cases against 
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investigations.
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April 28, 2004.
97 While the European Union does not exactly follow the NME 
methodology used by the United States, the European Union 
does apply a “third country market” (TCM) designation in Chi-
nese AD cases, which amounts to about the same thing. During 
July 2003–December 2003, the average EU AD duty (about 
46 percent), based on the TCM methodology, was lower than 
the average US AD duty (about 94 percent). See WTO (2004c, 
2004d) and EU Council (1994).
98 See Tobias Buck and Mure Dickie, “Europe to Snub China on 
Status of Economy,” Financial Times, June 28, 2004.
99 US furniture producers’ share of the US market declined from 
60 percent in 2000 to 49 percent in 2002, while the Chinese 
share of the US market increased from 19 percent in 2002 to 28 
percent in 2003. These ﬁgures illustrate the period under review 
for the material injury ﬁnding by the USITC (2004b). See also 
“Chinese Furniture Faces US Tariffs,” The Wall Street Journal, 
June 17, 2004, A2.
100 See the previous section on nonmarket economy status.
101 The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), 
widely known as the Byrd Amendment, mandates distribution 
of AD duties and CVD to companies that support the relevant 
petitions. To date, the US government has paid more than $700 
million to US companies. In January 2003, the WTO Appellate 
Body determined the Byrd Amendment violated WTO rules and 
distorts trade. In March 2004, the US Congressional Budget Of-
ﬁce reported that the Byrd Amendment harms the US economy. 
See Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2004a).
102 The Chinese government also made a preliminary AD 
determination against imports of US optical-ﬁber products by 
Corning, Inc. However, in 2003 just 6 percent of Corning’s $760 
million global sales were to China. See “China Accuses Corning 
of ‘Dumping’,” The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2004.Number PB04-5 September 2004 34
103 The difference between WBF and hydrazine hydrate and 
optical ﬁber cases illustrates another point: The United States 
often pursues trade remedies to protect manufacturing jobs, 
while China pursues trade remedies to encourage its nascent 
high-tech ﬁrms.
104 Based on mid-2003 US consumption ﬁgures. See USITC 
(2004b).
105 Domestic demand is expected to increase between 10 to 15 
percent annually over the next few years as home ownership 
grows. In 2003, Chinese furniture sales increased by a stunning 
43 percent. 
106 Under the WTO Accession Agreement, China reduced import 
tariffs on furniture from 22 to 7.5 percent in 2003, and all 
tariffs will be eliminated by January 2005. 
107 To compete in the Chinese domestic market, IKEA lowered 
prices by 10 percent in 2003 and increased sales by 35 percent. 
See “IKEA Outlines Mainland Expansion Plan,” Xinhua News 
Agency, April 23, 2004.
108 Overall, Chinese furniture costs are about 10 to 40 percent 
less than US costs. See Cao, Hansen, and Xu (2002).
109 According to the USITC (2004b), Chinese production 
increased from 1.8 million pieces of furniture and related prod-
ucts in 2000 to 4.5 million in 2002. 
110 See CSIL (2003) and “Research Report on Furniture Industry 
and Market of China,” All China Marketing Research Co. Ltd., 
2001.
111 See USITC (2004b). The value of Chinese WBF exports to the 
United States accounted for 95 percent of total Chinese WBF 
exports.
112 Hong Kong purchased 13 percent and the European Union 
purchased 12 percent of Chinese furniture exports. While US 
imports from Canada (second largest US furniture supplier) and 
Mexico (fourth largest US furniture supplier) fell by $91 million 
during 2000–03, US imports from China increased by $804 mil-
lion in the same period. Meanwhile, total US furniture exports 
declined from $105 million in 2000 to $78 million in 2003 (table 
12). See China National Furniture Association Annual Report 
2003.
113 Chinese furniture imports from the United States are small, 
about $1 million in 2002.
114 See David Lague, “Felling Asia’s Forests: China’s Insatiable 
Appetite for Timber,” Far Eastern Economic Review. December 
25, 2003. See also Cossalter and Pye-Smith (2003). 
115 In 2003, the United States exported about $395 million of 
ofﬁce furniture and imported about $2.3 billion. Based on US 
DOC data on “Household and Ofﬁce Furniture” exports and 
imports, available at www.ita.doc.gov/td/ocg/furniture.htm 
(accessed May 2004).
116 See Elizabeth Wine, “US Furniture Makers To Risk Lifting 
Prices,” Financial Times, May 10, 2004.
117 Foreign concerns about the Chinese internal tax system were 
expressed in the October 2001 WTO Working Party Report on 
China’s WTO Accession; see paragraphs 19 to 21 and 167.
118 According to the USTR, the VAT payments on imported chips 
cost US chipmakers about $344 million in 2003. See Neil King 
Jr., “US Fights China’s Tax on Imported Chips,” The Asian Wall 
Street Journal, March 19, 2004, A4. 
119 GATT Article 3 states that each WTO member must provide 
foreign producers the same treatment given to domestic ﬁrms 
with respect to internal taxation and regulation. See “WTO Ana-
lytical Index: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,” 
available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_in-
dex_e/gatt1994_02_e.htm#articleIIIA (accessed April 2004).
120 Japan threatened to ﬁle its own WTO complaint against 
China if it is not allowed to participate in talks. Highlighting the 
tangled national interests, some Japanese ﬁrms are lukewarm 
toward ﬁling a WTO complaint, since they beneﬁt from China’s 
differential tax treatment. See David Philling, “Tokyo May Com-
plain To WTO Over China Chips Tax,” Financial Times, 
April 4, 2004. 
121 See USTR Press Release, “US and China Resolve WTO Dis-
pute Regarding China’s Tax on Semiconductors,” July 8, 2004.
122 Integrated circuits are an advanced version of semiconduc-
tors. The Chinese IC industry is expected to realize about $12 
billion in sales by 2013.
123 In an effort to make this recommendation more palatable to 
China, the SIA points at the bright side of Chinese experience 
under the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA, 
signed by WTO members in 1997). The ITA eliminated tariffs 
on many IT products; after China acceded to the WTO and the 
ITA in 2001, the Chinese smuggling rate on semiconductors 
declined.
124 In 1997, the US semiconductor industry represented 33 per-
cent of the world market and the Asia-Paciﬁc region represented 
22 percent. By 2001, Asia-Paciﬁc countries, including China, 
represented close to 30 percent of the world market, while the 
United States dropped to about 25 percent. See Hatano (2003). 
125 China already has the world’s largest mobile phone market 
and second largest personal computer market. China produces 
over 7 percent of global electronics equipment, and this volume 
is estimated to rise 11 percent annually. See Chao and Suss-
man (2003).
126 Similarly, Chinese IC exports to the United States increased 
by 628 percent from $59 million in 1995 to $431 million in 
2002, while US exports to China increased by 880 percent 
from $165 million in 1995 to $1.6 billion in 2002. Based on 
data from US DOC, International Trade Administration, Trade 
Compliance Center.
127 Currently China adds only about 5 percent of the value of 
chips sold. For example, Intel’s plant in Shanghai does not 
make chips but rather tests and assembles chips from silicon 
wafers made in US plants. See Andres Higgins, “Power and 
Peril: America’s Supremacy and Its Limits,” The Wall Street 
Journal, January 30, 2004.
128 Special investment zones include ﬁve special economic 
zones, 32 economic and technological development zones, 52 
high-technology zones, 260 coastal open-city zones, and various 
technology zones in major cities (e.g., Shanghai Pudong New 
Area and Beijing Zhongguancun Science and Technology Zone). 
129 Subsequently bought by Semiconductor Manufacturing 
International Corporation (SMIC) in January 2004. 
130 Chao and Sussman (2003). Similar tax incentives are given 
in the domestic car industry (see appendix table 4). See Richard Number PB04-5 September 2004 35
McGregor, “China Acts to Shut Out Car Entrants,” Financial 
Times, June 2, 2004. 
131 The WTO Appellate Body determined that shochu and vodka 
are like products and that preferential taxation of domestic sho-
chu discriminated against imported vodka, contravening GATT 
Article 3 (2). See WTO (1996).
132 According to Larry Sussman (Chao and Sussman 2003), 
a Chinese tax expert at O’Melveny & Myers, the Chinese VAT 
rebate might be distinguished from the facts in previous WTO 
panel decisions. See Mure Dickie, “China Mulls Response to US 
Chip Tax Complaints,” Financial Times, April 1, 2004. 
133 For WTO purposes, like semiconductors would be deﬁned 
in terms of consumer willingness to substitute the imported 
semiconductor for a domestically manufactured one and the 
degree to which consumers perceive two semiconductors as 
functionally equivalent. See Hudec (2000). 
134 Such payments might be challenged under GATT Article 16 
as domestic subsidies inconsistent with WTO rules—but then 
the challenger must show “adverse effects”—in other words, 
some degree of harm to its exports or domestic production. In 
its accession protocol, China waived several clauses in the SCM 
Code that provide ﬂexibility to developing and transition econo-
mies. See Lardy (2002a, 89–91). However, the more rigorous 
standards applicable to developed countries and China have a 
much stronger bite when subsidized products are exported than 
when they are produced solely for the domestic market. 
135 South Korea is also developing a government-sponsored 
Wireless Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI) on new 
mobile phones. WIPI threatens to keep Qualcomm’s BREW 
downloading software out of the market. See Judy Lee, “S. Ko-
rea Delays Mobile Standard Opposed By Qualcomm,” Reuters, 
January 19, 2004. 
136 Edward Alden, “US and China Reach Deal on Trade Dis-
putes” Financial Times, April 21, 2004. See “US Wins Major 
Trade Concessions From China At Senior Meeting,” Inside US 
Trade, April 23, 2004. 
137 See US DOC’s ruling in US Federal Register (2004). In 
response to the preliminary DOC ruling, the Chinese economic 
counselor, Tian Jun, noted that the Chinese government had 
not intervened in the Chinese TV market since 1984. See 
Jun (2004).
138 The four leading Chinese CTV makers are Prima, Konka, 
TCL, and Changhong. Changhong faces the highest AD duties, 
26.37 percent. In November, TCL merged with Thomson, a 
French maker of RCA brand TVs, creating the world’s largest TV 
manufacturer with $3.5 billion in annual sales. See “US Places 
Duties on TVs from China,” Los Angeles Times, Home Edition, 
May 15, 2004, C3; also see US DOC, “Amended Final Determi-
nation of Sales at less than Fair Value: Certain Color Television 
Receivers from China,” May 2004. 
139 The other producers did not submit cost information to the 
US DOC, so AD duties were based on “best information 
available.” 
140 The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), based on the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention, 1883) 
and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (Berne Convention, 1886), is the minimum IPR 
standard for WTO members. The Madrid Agreement, based on 
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registra-
tion of Marks (1891), updated by the Protocol Relating to the 
Madrid Agreement (1996), provides for international registration 
of trademarks.
141 According to the International Intellectual Property Alliance 
(IIPA), Chinese piracy accounted for about 25 percent of world-
wide total lost sales by US ﬁrms in 2003. See IIPA (2004). 
142 For example, in June 2004, US Commerce Secretary Donald 
Evans raised concerns about a Chinese car company, Chery, 
which pirated one of General Motor’s (GM) designs. GM’s China 
operations will earn an estimated $800 million in 2004, but pi-
racy is still a concern. See Richard McGregor, “Capacity Short-
age Curbs GM Sales in China,” Financial Times, June 23, 2004.
143 According to economist Keith Maskus (2000), such estimates 
are probably exaggerated because they assume that current 
sales levels would not fall if prices rose as a result of eliminating 
piracy. See also IIPA (2003) 
144 Economist T.N. Srinivasan (2000) points out that patents 
and copyrights are essentially monopoly rights that allow IPR 
owners to charge higher prices. Srinivasan argues that the 
TRIPS agreement distorts trade by extending the system of 
monopoly rights to production in developing countries and that 
industrialized countries are the main beneﬁciaries. Maskus 
(2000) estimates that in 1995, rent transfers from global patent 
rights totaled about $8.3 billion to six industrialized countries, 
of which the United States received the overwhelming share, 
some $5.8 billion.  
145 Maskus (2000) estimates that stronger IPRs could increase 
Chinese total factor productivity by about 0.25 percentage 
points per year. However, one of his regression equations sug-
gests that China needs to signiﬁcantly increase its per capita 
income before patent rights can be enforced. 
146 China is ranked among the top ten countries worldwide in 
absolute level of R&D expenditure. See Schaaper (2004). 
147 Measured by patents applied for or granted by the US Patent 
and Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO) and European Patent Ofﬁce 
(EPO). During 1995–2003, China accounted for about 0.3 per-
cent of patent grants and applications. See OECD (2004).
148 On the other hand, some economists like Srinivasan (2000) 
argue there is little evidence that patent protection spurs 
innovation.  
149 A growing area of concern is pharmaceutical piracy.  In July 
2004, China overturned Pﬁzer Inc.’s Chinese patent for Viagra.  
While Pﬁzer would not disclose sales in China, Viagra worldwide 
sales increased by 8 percent in 2003 to reach $1.9 billion.  See 
“China Voids Pﬁzer’s Viagra Patent,” The Wall Street Journal, 
July 8, 2004.  
150 It is estimated that 80 percent of all pirated VCDs, CDs, CD-
ROMs, and DVDs are sold to satisfy growing domestic demand. 
See IIPA (2003). 
151 Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), a ranking member of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee, noted the successful outcome of the 
WTO semiconductor case suggests the United States should ini-
tiate more WTO cases.  Baucus targeted IPR as the next priority 
for WTO trade cases. Based on Baucus’ remarks at the Global 
Business Dialogue, “Democrats and FTAs,” July 13, 2004. 
152 In 1988, Clyde Prestowitz published the classic book on the 
Japanese “threat” titled Trading Places. See also Bergsten and 
Noland (2001). Number PB04-5 September 2004 36
153 See Bergsten (1998). 
154 The ratio of Chinese imports to GDP, known as the import 
ratio, is also signiﬁcantly higher than Japan. In 2003, China’s 
import ratio reached 30 percent while Japan’s ratio was only 8 
percent. See Lardy (2003). 
155 The large stock of FDI in China provides a degree of pro-
Chinese support when trade disputes loom, much as in the case 
of US-EU relations where large FDI in both directions serves to 
moderate trade frictions. 
156 As long as FDI enters China, a zero “basic balance” means 
that China will incur a trade deﬁcit. 
157 Under WTO regulations, by December 11, 2004, China will 
give all foreign-owned joint venture companies trading rights. 
China also ensured a market for US exports of biotech soybeans 
and promised to welcome US exports of wheat, cotton, corn, 
and other agricultural products. See “US Gets Array of Conces-
sions from China,” Washington Trade Daily 13, no. 81, April 22, 
2004. See also Edward Alden, “US and China Reach Deal on 
Trade Disputes,” Financial Times, April 21, 2004.
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Several remedies are available if the US government 
(and other WTO members) decide that rapidly ris-
ing textile and clothing imports from China are too 
painful for the domestic industry. 
Safeguard remedies
Under the WTO, the US government can apply 
the  China-speciﬁc  Textile  Safeguard  (Paragraph 
238, which lasts until 2008) to limit the growth of 
Chinese textile and clothing exports to the United 
States to 7.5 percent of total exports during the 12-
month  period  terminating  two  months  before  the 
consultation  requests  were  made.  The  process  of 
applying the Textile Safeguard is very easy. Once a 
WTO member “believes” that imports of textile and 
clothing from China cause “market disruption,” the 
growth cap is applied immediately and lasts for a 
maximum one-year period. Optional consultations 
begin after the cap is applied. The relatively effort-
less  process  explains  why  the  WTO  Textile  Safe-
guard was used in the brassiere case. 
Under the WTO, the US government can apply 
the Transitional Product Safeguard (Paragraph 241, 
which lasts until 2013) to restrict Chinese textile 
and clothing imports, with no time limit. Unlike the 
WTO  Textile  Safeguard,  the  Transitional  Product 
Safeguard (TPS) is not automatic. The TPS requires 
a US International Trade Commission (USITC) in-
vestigation and public hearing to determine whether 
there is “material injury or threat of material injury 
to the domestic industry.” By comparison with the 
Textile Safeguard, this is a lengthy process. 
Under regular safeguard rules in domestic law, 
the US government can apply a quota or tariff un-
der Sections 421 and 422 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
to limit Chinese textile and clothing exports, if Chi-
nese exports cause “market disruption” or “threaten 
to cause, a signiﬁcant diversion of trade” into the 
domestic  US  market.  Sections  421  and  422  were 
added to the Trade Act of 1974 in 2000 (as modiﬁ-
cations to Section 406), when Congress ratiﬁed per-
Appendix A: Safeguard and antidumping remedies against textile and clothing imports 
manent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China. 
The quota or tariff limit requires an ITC hearing and 
has an unlimited duration at the discretion of the 
US president. 
Under regular safeguard rules in domestic law, 
the US government can apply an “escape clause” 
tariff under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
to limit Chinese textile and clothing exports upon 
ﬁnding that imports caused “serious injury” to do-
mestic producers. Unlike other safeguards, Section 
201 involves global safeguard investigations (except 
for speciﬁc countries with which the United States 
has free trade agreements, such as the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners, pro-
vided they are excluded from the injury investiga-
tions). The tariff limit lasts for up to four years, with 
the possibility of extension for a maximum of eight 
years at the discretion of the US president. 
Antidumping remedies
Under China’s accession protocol to the WTO, 
China  can  be  considered  a  nonmarket  economy 
(NME) by the United States and other WTO mem-
bers, which allows the US Department of Commerce 
(US  DOC)  to  ignore  domestic  Chinese  prices  and 
costs when determining antidumping duties on Chi-
nese exports. The NME status expires in 2015.
Under US domestic law, antidumping (AD) duty 
calculations, made by the US DOC, embody several 
arbitrary calculations. These can be slanted in favor 
of, or against, an AD target. The presence of “mate-
rial injury” to the domestic industry (a low threshold 
of trade impact) is determined by the USITC. The 
AD duty is revoked after a ﬁfth year review unless 
the US DOC and USITC determine that a revocation 
would lead to a recurrence of dumping and injury. 
Sources: Lardy (2002b); Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004); Ian-
chovichina and Martin (2003); Ikenson (2003b); WTO (2001); 
Finger (1993); and Lindsey and Ikenson (2002).Number PB04-5 September 2004 38
Appendix B: Short history of US-Japan trade frictions
Textiles and apparel 
In January 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower 
established  a  ﬁve-year  voluntary  restraint  agree-
ment (VRA) to limit Japanese cotton textile exports. 
By July 1961, President John F. Kennedy evolved 
the textile VRA into the Short-term Arrangement on 
International Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA), signed 
by 19 countries. In October 1962, the STA became 
the Long-Term Arrangement (LTA). President Lyn-
don Johnson renewed the LTA; and in 1974, Presi-
dent Richard Nixon widened its scope to become the 
Multi-Fiber  Arrangement  (MFA).  Japanese  textile 
and clothing exports dropped signiﬁcantly after the 
VRA and by the 1970s, other emerging countries, 
such as Hong Kong, India and Pakistan, replaced 
Japan as leading textile and clothing exporters.
Steel
As Japan shifted from textile and clothing ex-
ports to steel exports, the United States imposed re-
strictions. From January 1969 to December 1974, 
the United States established VRAs with Japan and 
the European Community (EC) to limit carbon steel 
imports.  The  United  States  periodically  imposed 
VRAs, antidumping (AD) duties and safeguard mea-
sures  (Section  201)  against  Japanese  and  other 
steel exporters throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s. 
Autos
As Japan strengthened its presence as a leading 
auto exporter, the United States restricted Japanese 
auto exports. From April 1981 to March 1985, the 
United States imposed auto VRAs against Japanese 
auto exports, followed by Japanese export restraints 
throughout the 1980s until the early 1990s. Bilater-
al negotiations resulted in a Japanese agreement to 
purchase US auto parts between 1990 and 1995. 
Motorcycles
When Japanese heavyweight motorcycle exports 
(mainly Kawasaki) captured a growing share of the 
US market, the United States imposed quotas on 
Japanese  motorcycle  imports  between  1983  and 
1988 to protect Harley Davidson. 
Color TV receivers
To limit Japanese, as well as Korean and Taiwan-
ese, exports of color TV receivers, President Jimmy 
Carter established an Orderly Marketing Agreement 
during 1977–82. 
Semiconductors
From  September  1986  to  July  1991,  Japan 
agreed, at US insistence, to restrict its exports of 
semiconductors,  mainly  dynamic  random  access 
memory (DRAM) chips. The US-Japan Semiconduc-
tor Agreement established a price ﬂoor, or “fair mar-
ket value,” on certain semiconductors and commit-
ted Japan to purchase more US semiconductors. 
Machine tools 
From  January  1987  to  December  1991,  the 
United States limited imports of Japanese machine 
tool exports. 
Other trade remedies
• In 1989, the United States launched the Super 
301 process of the 1974 Trade Act (as amended 
by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act) and the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive (SII) with Japan. Super 301 allowed the US 
Trade Representative (USTR) to target Japanese 
practices that limit US exports and impose trade 
sanctions against Japanese exports deemed to 
violate trade agreements (notably the GATT and 
WTO). SII provided a forum for the United States 
and  Japan  to  discuss  structural  problems  in 
both countries that impede trade and balance of 
payments adjustment. 
• From 1984 to 1989, USTR Bill Brock led the 
US  Market  Opening  Sector  Speciﬁc  (MOSS) 
talks with Japan. MOSS promoted deregulation 
and openness in the Japanese telecommunica-
tions,  pharmaceuticals,  electronics,  forestry, 
and medical equipment sectors. 
• Between the late 1960s and 1988, the Unit-
ed States and Japan had numerous citrus and 
beef disputes, which gradually led to the expan-
sion of Japanese quota limits on citrus and beef 
trade. Other disputes on agricultural market ac-
cess are still unresolved. 
Source: Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott (1986).  Number PB04-5 September 2004 39
Bill number Date introduced Issues addressed Description
H.R. 851
Cong. Slaughter (D-NY)
Feb. 2003 Job loss, environment, 
and workers rights
No comment on revaluation. 
Proposes a “Trade Impact Review 
Commission” to assess the impact 




Sept. 2003 Currency, trade deﬁcit, 
and job loss
States RMB is undervalued by 15 
to 40 percent. Authorizes tariff of 
27.5 percent on US imports from 




Sept. 2003 Currency, trade deﬁcit, 
and job loss
Recommends a ﬂoating, market-
based exchange rate. Asks China to 
stop manipulating its currency and 
instead fulﬁll its commitments to 
the WTO and IMF.
H.R. 3058
Cong. English (R-PA)
Sept. 2003 Currency 
and trade deﬁcit
Recommends RMB revaluation. 
Requires US treasury secretary 
to analyze Chinese exchange rate 
policies and impose tariffs on 




Sept. 2003 Currency, trade deﬁcit, 
and job loss
States RMB undervalued by 
15 to 40 percent. Requires US 
International Trade Commission 
to determine the scope of currency 
manipulation and trade barriers 
(e.g., VAT practices). If US and 
Chinese governments cannot reach 
an agreement, then recommends 
safeguards under Sections 301 and 
406 of the Trade Act of 1974.
H. Con. Res. 285
Cong. Manzullo (R-IL)
Sept. 2003 Currency, trade deﬁcit, 
and job loss
States undervalued RMB is 
responsible for 40 percent of the 
decline in US manufacturing 
jobs and production. Cites IMF 
recommendation that China 
adopt a ﬂoating exchange rate. 




Oct. 2003 Trade No comment on revaluation. 
Recommends withdrawal of normal 
trade relations (i.e., most-favored-
nation treatment) for imports from 
China.
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Bill number Date introduced Issues addressed Description
H.R. 3269
Cong. Dingell (D-MI)
Oct. 2003 Currency Asks the US secretary of 
commerce to asses whether 
currency manipulation affects 
the US manufacturing sector and 
evaluate whether reduced Chinese 
accumulation of US dollars would 
affect US monetary policy.
S. 1758
Sen. Voinovich (R-OH)
Oct. 2003 Currency and 
trade deﬁcit
States RMB is undervalued by 40 
percent. Requires US Treasury 
Secretary to analyze Chinese 
exchange rate policies and impose 
additional tariffs on Chinese 
products to offset “currency 
manipulation.” Recommends 
retaliatory action under Sections 




Oct. 2003 Currency 
and job loss
States exchange rate is 
undervalued 15 to 40 percent. If 
the United States cannot negotiate 
a revalued RMB, proposes 27.5 




Oct. 2003 Currency 
and job loss
Recommends a ﬂoating exchange 
rate “determined by the 
market.” Asks China to fulﬁll its 
international trade agreements, 
support the US manufacturing 




Nov. 2003 Currency 
and job loss
Recommends a ﬂoating, market-
based RMB exchange rate. Asks US 
Treasury to expedite negotiations 




Jan. 2004 Nonmarket 
economies
Recommends an amendment 
to allow the US Department of 
Commerce to hear countervailing 
duty cases against “nonmarket” 
economies such as China
Source: Thomas Legislative Information, Library of Congress, available at thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.html 
(accessed March 2004).
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Appendix table 2: Ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial proposals for renminbi revaluation 
Ofﬁcial/economist Extent of revaluation Reason
John Snow,
US Secretary of the Treasury
Floating exchange rate, liberalize 
capital controls. No target speciﬁed 
for RMB.
Urges a ﬂoating RMB to boost US 
exports to China and reduce global 
macroeconomic imbalances.
Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Revaluation. No target speciﬁed for 
RMB.
Currency intervention causes 
inﬂation and creates internal and 
external imbalances. China needs to 
resolve nonperforming loans problem 
before ﬂoating the RMB. To restore 





“Flexible” exchange rate rather 
than ﬂoating rate; maintain 
capital controls. Former IMF Chief 
Economist Kenneth Rogoff cautioned 
against a large appreciation.
Given the weak Chinese banking 
system, IMF recommends a “ﬂexible” 
but not a ﬂoating exchange rate. 
Does not specify the degree or timing 
for revaluation.
US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission
Substantial appreciation of RMB 
between 15 and 40 percent based on 
trade-weighted basket of currencies.
Manipulation of RMB exacerbates US 
trade deﬁcit with China and hurts 
the US manufacturing sector in 
particular.
Morris Goldstein and  
Nicholas Lardy,
Institute for International Economics
15 to 25 percent, followed by wider 
currency band and switch to three-
currency basket peg.
China and the global economy 
cannot wait for liberalized capital 
controls before RMB revaluation. 
China should not adopt a ﬂoating 




Immediate 20 percent revaluation, 
a new peg with a wider band and 
liberalized capital controls.
Chinese “currency manipulation” 
violates IMF and WTO commitments, 
increases the US trade deﬁcit, and 
harms US manufacturing and 
defense sectors.
Franklin J. Vargo,
National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM)
Revaluation of at least 20 percent. Undervalued RMB enlarges US-
China trade deﬁcit and encourages 
neighboring Asian countries to 
continue pegging their currencies.Number PB04-5 September 2004 42
Ofﬁcial/economist Extent of revaluation Reason
A. Benassy-Quere et al.,
University of Paris
25 to 51 percent. Undervalued RMB magniﬁes the 
extent of adjustment by the euro and 
other currencies.
Haruhiko Kuroda,special adviser to 
Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi 
Crawling peg of 7 to 10 percent per 
year until 40 percent appreciation 
reached; maintain capital controls.
Undervalued RMB creates external 




5 to 10 percent, followed by managed 
ﬂoat.
Countering inﬂationary pressure and 
domestic overheating requires only a 
modest appreciation rather than big-
step revaluation.
Tom Gallagher,  
ISI Group
Against immediate revaluation. A revalued RMB would give the 
Chinese government less money 
to buy US debt and drive down 
US Treasury bond prices, thereby 
increasing US interest rates.
Stephen Roach and 
Andy Xie,
Morgan Stanley
Against revaluation. China does not compete based on an 
undervalued currency. RMB did not 
contribute to the US-China bilateral 
trade deﬁcit. Removing the RMB 




Against revaluation. Appreciation would exacerbate non 
performing loans problem, stiﬂe 
economic growth, reduce foreign 




Against revaluation. RMB appreciation could cause 
serious deﬂation ending with a zero 
interest liquidity trap.
Sources: Snow (2004a, b); Greenspan (2004a, b); Julie Ziegler, “IMF Backs China in Debate on Yuan Peg,” Bloomberg News, July 
23, 2003; US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report (2004); Nicholas Lardy and Morris Goldstein, “A Modest 
Proposal for China’s Renminbi,” Financial Times, August 26, 2003; Preeg (2003); Vargo (2003); Benassy-Quere et al. (2004); 
Haruhiko Kuroda, “How to Help the Renminbi Find Its Own Level,” Financial Times, October 17, 2003; Eichengreen (2004); Jon D. 
Markman, “Who Wins if China Devalues Its Currency?” MSN MoneyCentral; Mundell (2004); McKinnon (2004); Roach (2003); and 
Xie (2003).
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Textile and clothing industry United Statesa Chinab
Textile 
Average hourly earnings (in dollars) 10.08 0.88
Total employees  293,930   4,775,000 
Total compensation (in billions of dollars)c 10.0 4.7
Total value of shipments (in billions of dollars) 45.7 73.1
Total labor costs as share of total sales 0.22 0.11
Clothing 
Average hourly earnings (in dollars) 9.70 0.88
Total employees  456,471   2,027,000 
Total compensation (in billions of dollars)c 11.0 2.2
Total annual sales (in billions of dollars) 54.6 33.0
Total labor costs as share of total sales 0.20 0.10
a. Includes fringe beneﬁts.
b. Chinese clothing hourly wages are assumed to be the same as average Chinese textile wages (includes fringe beneﬁts). 
According to UNCTAD, in 1998, Chinese textile wages averaged about 62 cents per hour and Chinese clothing wages 
averaged about 43 cents per hour. 
c. Calculated as total employees times average hourly earnings times 1,920 hours per year. 
Sources: US Annual Survey of Manufacturers (2003); China Statistical Yearbook (2003); Gerefﬁ (2003); UNCTAD, “Trade 
and Development Report: China’s Accession to WTO,” 2002; and Nordas (2004). 
Appendix table 3: Comparison of employment and labor costs in textile and clothing  
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Type of tax Eligibility requirements Beneﬁts
Domestic VAT Domestic Chinese ﬁrm that 
produces qualiﬁed IC products 
between 2002 and 2010.
Only subject to effective 3 percent VAT rate (after 
rebate of 14 percent), compared with general 17 
percent VAT.
Foreign ﬁrm that invests about $1 
billion and/or produces IC with 
line width less than 0.25 microns.
Exempt from import-related VAT on IC 
production. The result is a 3 percent effective 
VAT when investor sells ﬁnished ICs in the 
domestic market, compared with the normal rate 
of 17 percent.
Foreign investment generally. Competition between local governments 
and investment zones may lead to subsidies 
approximately equal to the VAT.
Import VAT Export ﬁnished product. VAT on inputs (domestic or imported) rebated on 
exports (standard practice under WTO rules).
Business income tax Foreign ﬁrms that invest in 
semiconductor production or 
other high-technology industries.
Pay central income tax at a rate reduced from 30 
percent to below 15 percent for a holiday period. 
Usually waive or reduce local tax of 3 percent.
Foreign ﬁrm with advanced 
technology production techniques 
and equipment, involved in 
projects encouraged by the 
Chinese government.
Technologically Advanced Enterprise Status: 5-
year full exemption, 5-year 50 percent reduction 
in income tax rate to minimum rate of 7.5 
percent and 3-year 50 percent reduction to 
minimum rate of 10 percent. 
Withholding tax Foreign company that imports 
qualiﬁed advanced technology. 
Exempt from withholding tax on outbound 
royalties rather than regular 14.5 percent rate.  
R&D Foreign company that establishes 
R&D center, if R&D expenses 
increase by 10 percent or more in 
two consecutive years.
Deduct 150 percent of R&D expenses for 
business income tax purposes.
Import quotas Import equipment and technology 
under China’s “High and New 
Technology Products Catalog”
Imported components and software exempt from 
import quotas.
R&D = research and development
VAT = value added tax
IC = integrated circuit
Source: Chao and Sussman (2003).
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Appendix table 5: USTR ratings for IPR violations (ranked from least punitive to most punitive)
USTR IPR rating Deﬁnition Applicable sanctions
Watch List USTR monitors IPR policies in countries 
with some IPR violations
Not subject to automatic sanctions. 
Cannot be used to initiate trade action 
or dispute settlement process.
Priority Watch List USTR monitors IPR policies in countries 
with serious IPR violations.
Not subject to automatic sanctions. 
Can be used to initiate trade action or 
dispute settlement process. 
Priority Foreign Country  USTR initiates trade remedies against 
countries with the most serious IPR 
violations. 
Subject to either automatic Section 
301 investigationa or bilateral or WTO 
consultations. If negotiations fail, 
USTR must decide whether to apply 
trade sanctions within 18 months after 
initiation of investigation or 30 days 
after conclusion of dispute settlement 
procedures, whichever comes ﬁrst 
(or 12 months after initiation of an 
investigation in all other cases).  
a. Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the US government can impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that 
maintain policies that violate or deny US rights or beneﬁts under trade agreements, or are discriminatory and restrict US 
commerce.
USTR = United States Trade Representative
IPR = intellectual property rights
Source: US State Department, “US-China Intellectual Property Rights Glossary of Terms,” (2004).Number PB04-5 September 2004 46
USTR process or 
monitoring status
Deﬁnition Requirements Sanctions process
Section 306 Monitoring of 
Foreign Compliance  
(US Trade Act of 1974)
USTR monitoring to expedite 
resolution of Section 301 
investigation or dispute 
settlement proceedings. 
Does not require 
“Priority Foreign 
Country” status.
USTR must self-initiate 
Section 301 investigations 
by May 30. Or USTR must 
make determinations within 
six to nine months in cases 
where no trade agreement is 
involved. Afﬁrmative Section 
306 determination of poor IPR 
enforcement leads to USTR 
authorization for Section 
301 trade Section 301 trade 
sanctions.
Special 301 Process 
(Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 
1988)
USTR monitoring to expedite 
Section 301 trade sanctions. 
Warns potential investors 





USTR must self-initiate 
Section 301 investigations 
by May 30. Or USTR must 
make determinations within 
six to nine months in cases 
where no trade agreement is 
involved. Afﬁrmative Special 
301 determination of poor IPR 
enforcement leads to automatic 
Section 301 trade sanctions. 
Section 337  
(Tariff Act of 1930)
USITC investigation of patent 




USITC must establish target date 
for ﬁnal determination within 
45 days after investigation 
initiated. US president can reject 
or approve USITC determination 
within 60 days after he receives 
it. Afﬁrmative Section 337 
determination of poor IPR 
enforcement leads to any of 
the following trade actions: 
temporary exclusion order, 
cease-and-desist order with civil 
penalty of at least $100,000, or 
seizure and forfeiture of articles.
Sources: US State Department, “US-China Intellectual Property Rights Glossary of Terms,” (2004); USITC, “Understanding 
Investigations of Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair Practices in Import Trade,” (2004).
Appendix table 6: US trade policy measures to enforce IPR  (ranked from least punitive  
to most punitive)Number PB04-5 September 2004 47
Date USTR rating Reason 
Apr-89 Special 301 Priority Watch List. Poor IPR enforcement.
Apr-91 Special 301 Priority Foreign Country 
(PFC). First time PFC applied to a country 
under Special 301 investigation.
No administrative protection for pharmaceutical IPRs 
and other chemicals. 
Jan-92 Terminated Special 301 investigation and 
Section 301 case. 
Established US-China Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU).
Apr-92 Watch List. Surveillance of performance under January 1992 
MOU. 
Nov-93 Priority Watch List. Weak law enforcement against IPR infringement.
Jun-94 PFC, Special 301 investigation. Weak law enforcement against IPR infringement and 
insufﬁcient criminal penalties for counterfeiting.
Mar-95 Terminated Special 301 investigation and 
Section 301 case.
Established another US-China MOU. 
Apr-95 Watch List. Surveillance of performance under February 1995 
MOU. 
Apr-96 PFC, Special 301 investigation. Unsatisfactory implementation of 1995 MOU and 
continued high rates of piracy. 
Apr-98 Section 306 monitoring. Weak administrative protection for pharmaceutical 
IPR and high rates of piracy of computer software.
Apr-99 Section 306 monitoring. Ensure compliance with bilateral IPR agreements. 
Apr-01 Section 306 monitoring. Ensure compliance with bilateral IPR agreements. 
2005 (exact date 
unknown)
Out-of-cycle review. Requires further monitoring.
Source: US State Department, “Timeline of US and China IPR Developments” (2004).
Appendix table 7: History of China’s USTR IPR ratingsNumber PB04-5 September 2004 48




Dependent variable = Number of manufacturing workers (thousands)
Explanatory variables Coefﬁcient t-value
Manufactured output (billions of 
2003 dollars) 
8.178  16.68
Time trend (per quarter) –41.87 –16.96
Constant 5,638 7.74
Adjusted R-squared = 0.89
Number of observations = 56
Equation 2  
Dependent variable = Quarterly changes in manufactured output (billions of current dollars)
Explanatory variables Coefﬁcient t-value
Manufactures trade deﬁcit (billions 
of current dollars)
0.243 8.23
Nonmanufactures GDP (billions of 
current dollars)                 
0.099 20.44
Constant 149 17.16
Adjusted R-squared = 0.89
Number of observations = 56
Note: The statistical equations follow the method reported in Hufbauer and Rosen (2000), updated to cover 1990–2003.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004); US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2004); and Hufbauer and Rosen (2000).Number PB04-5 September 2004 49
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